

CURSO CACD

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CACD – 2ª FASE

**Provas discursivas
de Inglês**

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PROFESSOR
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COMPOSITION

Read the quotations below carefully.

Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations, fostering dialogue, and resolving conflicts between nations through peaceful means. It serves as the primary mechanism for promoting understanding, cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the international system.

Marie Julie in *Global Diplomacy – Investigating International Relations*.

We have no more reason to believe that the days of Gunboat Diplomacy are over than to believe that the threat of force will not be used on land and in the air.

T. B. Millar in James Cable *Gunboat Diplomacy – Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*.

Taking the quotations above into consideration, write a short essay explaining how these antagonistic views can be reconciled in the daily practice of Diplomacy. Provide a historical framework for your analysis.

Text length: 45 to 50 lines.
[value: 50,00 points]

The political study of international institutions reveals a vibrant and diverse body of scholarship. In recent decades, research has turned from the study of formal international organizations to the study of regimes and institutions, informal as well as formal. For the most part, this turn has been salutary, as it has reflected a broad interest not only in formal organizations but in the deeper role that rules and norms play in a system of formally co-equal states. Initially, this turn was instigated by the observation that much of what is interesting about world politics —especially during the Cold War period— seemed to take place among intensely interdependent actors, but beyond the purview of formal interstate organizations. This turn was furthered by a rational-functionalist approach to the study of institutions, which took up the puzzle of how we could understand international cooperation at all, given the assumptions of neorealism prevalent in the US international relations literature at the time. Meanwhile, in European circles, theorists of international society worked from sociological assumptions on a parallel question: how can order be maintained in an anarchical international society?

These orientations have made for interesting theoretical fireworks, as we have seen in the broader debates between today's constructivists and rationalists. This debate is clearly reflected in the institutional literature as a distinction between those who view international institutions (including institutional form) as rational responses to the strategic situations in which actors find themselves, versus those who insist on a subjective interpretation of social arrangements (which may or may not be "rational" and are unlikely to be understood through the use of positive methodologies).

MARTIN, Lisa L.; SIMMONS, Beth A. International Organizations and Institutions. In: CARLSNAES, Walter; RISSE, Thomas; SIMMONS, Beth A. (ed.). *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage, 2013. p. 343-344. [adapted]

Translate this excerpt into Portuguese.

[value: 15,00 points]

PROVA APLICADA

Recentemente, prevalece a tendência em se ver o relacionamento entre o cidadão e o Estado, o cidadão e o sistema político, o cidadão e a própria atividade política sob uma ótica maniqueísta, segundo a qual o Estado apresenta-se como o vilão e a sociedade, vítima indefesa.

Sabe-se que as dicotomias, via de regra, não se prestam a elucidações dos fenômenos de índole social. Teoricamente, elas separam o que são lados da mesma moeda, partes do mesmo todo. O maniqueísmo inviabiliza mesmo qualquer noção de cidadania, pois ou se aceita o Estado como mal necessário, à maneira agostiniana, ou se o nega totalmente, à moda anarquista.

Na prática, ele acaba por revelar uma atitude paternalista ao considerar o povo vítima impotente diante das maquinações do poder do Estado, ou de grupos dominantes. Acaba por bestializar o povo. Parece-nos ao contrário que, exceto em casos muito excepcionais e passageiros de sistemas respaldados inteiramente pela repressão, é mais fecundo conceber as relações entre o cidadão e o Estado como uma via de mão dupla, embora não necessariamente equilibrada. Todo sistema de dominação, para que sobreviva, terá de desenvolver uma base qualquer de legitimidade, ainda que seja a apatia dos cidadãos.

O momento de transição do Império para a República é particularmente propício ao estudo dessa questão. Tratava-se da primeira grande mudança do regime político após a independência. Mais ainda, tratava-se da implantação de um sistema de governo que propunha, exatamente, trazer o povo para o proscênio da atividade política.

CARVALHO, José Murilo de. *Os Bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi*. Companhia das Letras, 4. ed. 2019, com adaptações.

Translate this excerpt into English.

[value: 20 points]

Read the following text carefully.

Whilst there is a rich and growing literature on diplomacy, theories of diplomacy are less abundant. In view of its pivotal role in International Relations, diplomacy until recently received surprisingly little attention amongst theoretically oriented International Relations scholars. Indeed, a description of diplomacy is that it is “particularly resistant to theory”, and the well-known Israeli diplomat and foreign minister, Abba Eban, argued in 1983 that the “intrinsic antagonism” between theory and practice was more acute in diplomacy than in most other fields. This proposition may be less tenable today, as recent decades have seen a growing interest in, and several efforts to theorise, diplomacy. What is lacking, however, is “any metatheory of diplomacy – a theory of the theories of diplomacy – which might present all the different things that people want to identify and discuss in a single set of coherent relations with one another”.

Why, then, has diplomacy not been the object of more meta-theorising? There may be several reasons for the relative dearth of diplomatic theory. Two major factors relate to the conceptualisation of diplomacy and the character of the authors writing about diplomacy. A consensual conceptualisation of diplomacy that can serve as a foundation for theorising does not exist. Diplomacy “emerged as a contested concept”, and it “has repeatedly been contested over the last two centuries”. The use of the words “diplomacy” and “diplomatic” have several different meanings. In fact, the words have been characterised as “monstrously imprecise”, simultaneously signifying “content, character, method, manner and art”. According to Peter Marshall, a retired British diplomat, at least six related meanings may be distinguished.

First, “diplomacy” sometimes refers to the content of foreign affairs as a whole. Diplomacy then becomes synonymous with foreign policy. This means that theories of foreign policy are applicable. Second, “diplomacy” may connote the conduct of foreign policy. The word then becomes a synonym of statecraft. Henry Kissinger’s book, *Diplomacy*, which draws on his experiences as United States secretary of state, is a case in point. A third connotation of diplomacy focuses on the management of international affairs by negotiation; thus, the Oxford English Dictionary defines diplomacy as “the conduct of international relations by negotiation”. A similar definition is “negotiations between political entities which acknowledge each other’s independence”. Theories of negotiation, which are well developed, are then necessary to understand diplomacy. Fourth, understanding diplomacy resides in the use of diplomats, organised in a diplomatic service. This usage is more time-bound, as the organisation and professionalisation of diplomacy is rather recent. Fifth, diplomacy, and especially the adjective “diplomatic”, often refers to the manner of conducting relations. To be diplomatic means to use “intelligence and tact”, to quote Ernest Satow’s classic formulation. A sixth, related conceptualisation is to understand diplomacy more specifically as the art or skills of professional diplomats.

One definitional controversy concerns the non-violent character of diplomacy. Some experts conceptualise diplomacy in terms of “the peaceful conduct of relations” or “the establishment and development of peaceful contacts”, regarding diplomacy as the opposite to war or any use of force. Conversely, others are reluctant to draw such a clear-cut line, arguing either that the opposition of war and diplomacy is a Western notion; or that the blurring of the line between diplomacy and violence is one of the characteristics of modern diplomacy. During the Cold War, the coining of the phrase “coercive diplomacy” denoted the use of threats or limited force in diplomatic persuasion. In short, the lack of an agreed definition has been an obstacle to rigid theorising. As developed below, different conceptualisations of diplomacy entail different theoretical approaches.

A second major factor impeding the development of theory concerns the authorship of most works on diplomacy. Until recently, either practitioners or diplomatic historians wrote the bulk of the vast literature on diplomacy. Neither category of authors was particularly interested in theory building. Practitioners tended to be anecdotal rather than systematic, and diplomatic historians idiographic rather than nomothetic. Just as historians are interested in a particular past, practitioners draw on their own particular experiences. Neither practitioners nor diplomatic historians have been prone to generalise from different historical experiences and insights.

Diplomats have been prolific writers. Many have had scholarly ambitions and credentials and have reflected on their own practice to an extent that few other professions can match. Much of this literature is in the form of memoirs. In these works, there is a clear prescriptive bent. What characterises the good diplomat? How best to conduct diplomacy? These are questions occupying authors from antiquity to today. In addition to this prescriptive tendency, modern day ambassadorial memoirs tend to emphasise and exaggerate the profound changes that their authors claim to have experienced in their time of service whilst overlooking elements of continuity.

Diplomatic historians, for their part, have amassed a wealth of information about specific eras or incidents from antiquity onwards but have failed to forge any strong links with International Relations theorists. Although diplomatic history and International Relations have been characterised as “brothers under the skin”, academic parochialism as well as stereotypical and caricatured readings of one another’s sub-field have hampered interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation.

These and other aggravating factors notwithstanding, a number of theoretical approaches to diplomacy exist and continue to be developed. The most important of these, beginning with the long tradition of prescriptive tracts, offer observations and advice concerning the conduct of diplomacy. Realism, the predominant school of thought in International Relations scholarship after the Second World War, encompasses a conceptualisation of diplomacy tied to state power in an anarchic world. The so-

called English School offers a rivalling approach and different understanding of diplomacy, anchored in an international society with rules and institutions guiding state behaviour. Beside these two chief alternative approaches, there are more recent attempts at theorising diplomacy, drawing on post-positivist approaches, diplomatic understandings of international relations, suggestive metaphors, social anthropology, and gender studies.

JÖNSSON, Christer. Theorising Diplomacy. In: B.J.C. McKercher (ed.). *The Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft*. 2. ed. London/New York: Routledge, 2022 [2012]. p. 13-14. [adapted]

Write a summary of the text in your words.

Text length: up to 50 lines
[value: 15,00 points]

PROVA APLICADA

COMPOSITION

Read the following texts carefully.

“Diplomacy has adjusted to all economic, social and technological developments. It has changed simply in order to remain the same.”

Kurbalija, Jovan. *Don't Waste the Crisis: towards Diplomacy 2.0. Diplo* (blog). Dec. 3, 2010.
Accessed Apr. 14, 2022. <https://diplomacy.edu/blog>, with adaptations.

‘The quintessence of diplomacy is and has been the dealing with the interface of conflict and peace-making. And its practitioners’ ultimate goal remains the same: undertaking the challenging tasks or representing, negotiating, and reporting.’

Compare and contrast the quotations above and do a brief historical survey of the practice of the diplomacy of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Decide if the common core functions of traditional diplomacy have stood the test of time or if they have changed in any significant way.

Text length: 45 to 50 lines.
[value: 50,00 points]

TRANSLATION – ENGLISH-PORTUGUESE

Read the following text carefully.

Looking back upon the weird conversation, Clement saw this as a turning point. The speeding sky was dark outside, the room was dark, the rain now, no longer bothered by the wind, was falling with a steady faint sizzling hiss. The lamp illumed only the surface of the desk and one of Lucas's hands. The figure of Mir, suddenly rising up in the gloom, broad-shouldered, rectangular, seemed uncanny, unnaturally tall. Clement too, as if compelled by a kind of respect, or alarm, rose to his feet. Mir turned to him for a moment and Clement gained an impression of his head, suddenly like the head of a large animal, a boar, perhaps, or even a buffalo. Then Mir, noticing Clement also rising, smiled, his glinting teeth appearing as out of dark fur. Then he sat down again, and Clement, discreetly moving his chair forward and a little to the side, sat down too.

Lucas waited as if expecting Mir to say something, then said, not in his previous cold sarcastic tone, but as if more thoughtfully, "surely in your book it says that vengeance belongs to God."

Mir replied at once, as if saying something obvious, "I am His instrument."

MURDOCH, Iris. *The Green Knight*. London: Penguin, 1993. p. 124.

Translate this excerpt into Portuguese.

[value: 15,00 points]

TRANSLATION – PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH

Read the following text carefully.

Grande parte do assédio ao modernismo se manteve na tentativa de depreciar a sua revolução pela denúncia de seus estrangeirismos. O modernismo teria sido tão importado quanto as nossas outras mais antigas ondas culturais. [...].

A importação foi quase nada; em contraste com ela, a conquista do Brasil se tornou uma das glórias dessa poesia. [...].

A poesia de hoje se livrará do medíocre, do vácuo poético, quando reencontrar para si mesma a urgente precisão de nacionalidade tão bem sentida por Mário; quando recomeçar o caminho da intimidade com o social; quando finalmente compreender – como João Cabral de Melo Neto – que a herança de 22 manda impelir a poesia brasileira na direção dos grandes temas objetivos, sociais e filosóficos que a preparação de linguagem dos mestres do modernismo tornou possível e imperiosa. Não porque a literatura se melhora pela simples modificação dos assuntos, mas porque nenhuma língua poética, nenhum instrumento de alta expressão, jamais se renovou pelo tolo experimentalismo sem raiz na existência e no mundo – e sempre se expandiu, sempre ergueu seu tom e construiu seu símbolo, naquele exato momento em que a linguagem se abriu para a nervosa e complexa compreensão da vida social; da grande vida coletiva de que, na literatura como no mais, o país funda agora a mais vívida consciência – e do autêntico brasileirismo que os poetas de 22 tiveram o esforço e a glória de instaurar. (1962)

MERQUIOR, José Guilherme. A poesia modernista. in: *Razão do poema – Ensaios de crítica e de estética*. São Paulo: É Realizações Editora, 2016, pp. 40 e 50, com adaptações.

Translate this excerpt into English.

[value: 20 points]

SUMMARY

Read the following text carefully.

The Brazilians have a jewel for all the world to envy – a veritable Kohinoor among writers of fiction – Machado de Assis. More than any other people, those of the English-speaking world envy Brazil. This writer who so constantly used Shakespeare's model – so neatly fused into his own stories, the characters, the plots, and ideas of Shakespeare – that they may flatter themselves that only they can truly appreciate the great Brazilian. Since Machado himself referred many of his recurring ideas to Shakespeare, I have tried to trace such references to their source.

Machado's first novel appeared in 1872. Twenty-eight years later, he published his masterpiece, *Dom Casmurro* – perhaps the finest of all American novels. In both books, the reader witnesses this struggle of love and jealousy for possession of a man's heart, with love going down to tardy but complete defeat. Jealousy never ceased to fascinate Machado de Assis. Throughout his works, in articles as well as fiction, he often paused to stick a leisurely scalpel into some new manifestation of jealousy. Jealousy has a fat part in seven of his nine novels; the plots of 10 stories turn upon the ugly passion – though in seven of the latter, to be sure, it receives an ironic, if not rudely comic, treatment.

Shakespeare's *Othello* is brought into the argument of twenty-eight stories, plays, and articles. *Othello* is not the only play of Shakespeare that Machado de Assis hitched to his starry wagon. *Romeo and Juliet* serves as a plot for one novel and two short pieces. The character of Hamlet has a way of creeping in – even into his Othelloes. Ophelia, Jaques, Caliban, Lady Macbeth, and others turn up miraculously in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro. But let us stay for the present with *Othello* and *Dom Casmurro*.

Machado de Assis turned over the narration of *Dom Casmurro* to a figment of his imagination – it's hero Bento Santiago, a 57 years old recluse living in a suburb of Rio de Janeiro. Santiago calls himself an "Othello", but his disengaging air of frankness, calm impartiality and reasonableness more nearly resembles the bluff style of "honest Iago" than that of the impassioned Othello.

It is immediately apparent that Santiago is a subtle man, and a lawyer into the bargain, whose words the reader will do well to weigh carefully. It is he who discloses that his story is that of Othello, but with a certain important difference – his Desdemona is guilty.

There are other less important differences. Our Brazilian Othello, at the beginning of his tale, is not a man of mature years, a proud dusky warrior in strange, rich dress, who had seen men with their heads growing beneath their shoulders. He is a 15 year old boy given to daydreams that perhaps equaled in color and vividness the marvels the Moorish Othello knew. There is nothing hard and warlike about Santiago – he is even cowardly: witness the position in which we first find him, hiding behind a door. He was Christian and Catholic, with an aversion to bloodshed, the only child of a wealthy widow, and tied to his mothers' apron strings.

His Desdemona is the girl next door. Capitulina, or Capitú for short, only 14 but tall and well developed for her age – in fact, she was a little taller than her hero. She is not a highborn Venetian, but a rather poor girl; and, though like the other Desdemona she gazed upon her beauty in a mirror, it was a cheap little mirror bought for fifteen cents.

Shakespeare's Michael Cassio is Santiago's classmate Ezequiel Escobar. Like Cassio, Escobar is a great "mathematician", handsome, courteous, ingratiating. Like Cassio, he has a hand in Santiago's wooing, urged on the love affair between the young lovers, and acted as a go-between for their letters.

The Iago of the story, according to our hero, is José Dias, a trusted dependent of the Santiago household. Like his Shakespearean prototype, he devotes his energies to giving freely of his advice: he has no other regular occupation. Santiago says that he does it "just to make trouble", and this was the opinion of Cousin Justina, a poor relative, who acts as companion to Santiago's mother.

José Dias's ties begins to weave the plot, in which we identify the Othello in Santiago. He not only implants the seeds of love in Bento by his "informing"; he also implants the suspicion that Capitú would entrap and deceive him, with the remark about her "gypsy eyes". While Bento is in the seminary, although he goes home on many occasions, José Dias reports to him that, in his absence, Capitú is gay and carefree as usual, and that she will probably "hook" one of the young nobles in the neighbourhood and marry him. The thought that Capitú is happy while he is sad and lonesome, and that she is flirting with some handsome noble, turns Santiago's vague feeling of suspicion into definite jealousy. From this point on, Othello-Santiago takes over the role of Iago as well, and manipulates his own handkerchiefs to fan his own jealous passion.

Years later, Bentinho eventually marries Capitú, but spends a lifetime doubting her faithfulness. In their son's face, Ezequiel, he claims to only see Escobar's features. He ends up banishing his wife and son to Switzerland, where Capitú, after several years, dies alone, away from her family. Like Desdemona, she dies praising her Othello. She had spoken much of Bento to their son, praised him as "the finest man in the world and the most worthy of being loved".

As for Santiago, the conclusion to which he gradually leads the reader is that the deceit perpetrated against him by his dearly loved wife and dearly loved friend wrought upon him and changed him from the kind loving, ingenious Bento into the hard, cruel and cynical Dom Casmurro. Santiago tells us that the big difference between his story and Othello's is that Capitú is guilty. But there is a more obvious difference, one that arises perhaps from Santiago's own nature. The "accessory" – the "handkerchief of Desdemona" – in *Dom Casmurro* is the resemblance, or fancied resemblance, of Santiago's son, Ezequiel, to Escobar. Santiago's

putative Iago, José Dias, had abandoned the role long before this resemblance made its appearance. It is Santiago who discovers this resemblance; it is Santiago who manipulates this “handkerchief”. Machado’s formula for dramatic action could be read as the following: the jealous soul of Othello-Santiago, the perfidy of Iago-Santiago, and the guilt (or innocence) of Desdemona-Capitú – these are the principal elements of the action. The drama exists because it is in the natures, passions, and spiritual condition of Othello-Santiago, Iago-Santiago, and Desdemona-Capitú; the resemblance between Ezequiel and Escobar does not control these three characters, from whose passions the action flows.

CALDWELL, Helen. *The Brazilian Othello of Machado de Assis*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1960. pp V e VI e 1 - 12., with adaptations.

Write a summary of the text in your words.

Text length: up to 50 lines
[value: 15,00 points]

INSTRUÇÕES PARA AS PROVAS DISCURSIVAS

PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

Orientações para a elaboração dos textos das provas discursivas.

- A prova de língua inglesa é composta por 1 (um) tema de redação; 1 (um) texto em inglês – para tradução para a língua portuguesa; 1 (um) texto em português – para elaboração de versão em inglês; e 1 (um) texto em língua inglesa – para elaboração de resumo em inglês.
- A prova deverá ser manuscrita, em letra legível, com caneta esferográfica de tinta preta, fabricada com material transparente, e as respostas deverão ser transcritas para as folhas de texto definitivo.
- As **folhas de texto definitivo** das provas discursivas não poderão ser assinadas, rubricadas e nem conter, em outro local que não o apropriado, nenhuma palavra ou marca que identifique o candidato, sob pena de anulação da prova.
- As **folhas de texto definitivo** são os únicos documentos válidos para a avaliação das provas discursivas.
- O candidato receberá 6 (seis) folhas de texto definitivo das provas discursivas, sendo 2 (duas) para a redação, 1 (uma) para a tradução, 1 (uma) para a versão e 2 (duas) para o resumo. As folhas de texto definitivo indicarão se pertencem à redação, à tradução, à versão ou ao resumo. O candidato deverá observar atentamente a correspondência entre redação, tradução, versão e resumo e folha de texto definitivo, sob pena de ter o seu texto avaliado negativamente.
- O espaço para rascunho, contido no caderno de provas, é de preenchimento facultativo e não valerá para avaliação das provas discursivas.
- A resposta para a redação deverá ter extensão mínima de 45 (quarenta e cinco) linhas e máxima de 50 (cinquenta) linhas. O resumo deverá contemplar de 35% a 50% do texto em até 50 (cinquenta) linhas.
- Será apenas a redação que desobedecer à extensão mínima ou máxima de linhas, deduzindo-se, da pontuação atribuída à redação, **1,0 (um)** para cada linha que faltar para atingir o mínimo ou que exceder o máximo exigido.
- Inicie, impreterivelmente, o seu texto na linha identificada como número 1 na página inicial da folha de texto definitivo.

COMPOSITION

Read the following text carefully.

Having lost the opportunity opened at the creation of the United Nations, Brazil's aspiration to become a Security Council permanent member remained to a great extent dormant. The option left in 1945 had been to be elected by the General Assembly as a nonpermanent member. Brazil has done so for several terms since 1946, with the important exception of a gap of almost two decades, from 1969 to 1987, when the country shied away from the Council.

Garcia, E. V.; Coelho, N. B. R. (2018) A Seat at the Top? A Historical Appraisal of Brazil's Case for the UN Security Council. *SAGE Open*, 1–13, with adaptations.

Considering each administration in Brazil between the period of 1992 and 2019, discuss Brazil's attitude, approach and drive in search of a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. And, based on that historical background, briefly give your opinion on what Brazil's future behavior could be, bearing in mind the recent confirmation of its seat on the council for the period of 2022-2023.

Text length: 45 to 50 lines
[value: 50.00 points]

TRANSLATION – ENGLISH-PORTUGUESE

Read the following text carefully.

Any exchange of views about the underlying philosophy, structure, or operation of international relations begins with the concept of sovereignty. Viewed as “supreme authority”, it is the operational base of both international and domestic political life, although with quite opposite effects on the two realms. Ever since it surfaced as the bedrock organizational tenet of world politics in the latter part of the seventeenth century, it is, and has always been, a somewhat controversial foundation for world affairs. Dissension has surrounded matters such as the location of sovereignty and the extent of power that it conveys to its possessors, and concepts have evolved over time. Disagreements over sovereignty are conspicuous features of some debates about the evolving international order and the assault on its basic function is part and parcel of international conferring.

Seventeenth century nations witnessed the wresting of political power from the church and the attendant bestowal of this very power on secular authorities. This transfer was accompanied by the effective installation of sovereignty as the basis of relations among secular political communities. An ultimate outcome of this “marriage” was the association of sovereignty with territorial political jurisdictions. Mirroring the political period in which this concept became the bellwether of an evolving secular state-based system, sovereignty began as a principle that legitimized and promoted authoritarian rule. That principle was challenged with the rise of democratic thought, suggesting that sovereignty was a trait not only of the ruler but the ruled as well. From this challenge sprang the modern notion of popular sovereignty.

Snow, D. M. (2019) *Cases in International Relations – Principles and Applications*. (8th ed.). Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 3-4, with adaptations.

Translate this excerpt into Portuguese.

[value: 15.00 points]

TRANSLATION – PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH

Read the following text carefully.

A fala da língua

As técnicas modernas de mapeamento genético permitiram quantificar o que está à vista de todos. Enquanto nos Estados Unidos apenas 1% da população branca possui alguma ascendência africana, no Brasil a maioria dos brancos – cerca de 60% – pertence a linhagens africanas ou ameríndias em matéria de ascendência materna. O entrelaçamento genético se reflete no modo como os brasileiros se autotransparentam quando instados a declarar a cor de sua pele: de *galega* a *sará* e de *meio preta* a *cor de canela* e *puxa para branca*, o léxico cromático se ramifica em vasta e anárquica teia de designações.

A linguagem de um povo não é apenas um instrumento de comunicação na vida prática: ela incorpora elementos simbólicos e figurativos da cultura e traz inscrita em si mesma um modo particular de pensar e sentir. Há uma forma de vida embutida em nossa língua falada – *a língua fala*. Daí que, enquanto a presença de termos e expressões afro-indígenas no inglês norte-americano é rarefeita (ainda que não nula), ela transparece de forma ubíqua no português do Brasil. A permeabilidade da cultura luso-brasileira às culturas de raiz africana e ameríndia traduz-se em nossa fala comum e, como revela com exuberância de achados e exemplos o antropólogo baiano Antonio Risério, as áreas de maior influência linguística são justamente aquelas em que a presença afro-indígena passou a integrar o DNA da nossa cultura: a erótica-afetiva; a moral e os costumes; a culinária; música e dança, sem falar, é claro, no vasto domínio dos termos botânicos, zoológicos e toponímicos onde a presença do tupi é proeminente. A mistura das línguas do povo “inventadas-línguas” é a mistura dos genes por outros meios. “O que quer, o que pode esta língua?”

GIANNETTI, Eduardo. *Trópicos Utópicos*: uma perspectiva brasileira da crise civilizatória. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2016, com adaptações.

Translate this excerpt into English.

[value: 20.00 points]

SUMMARY

Read the following text carefully.

The Smile Revolution of the late eighteenth-century France had proved a false dawn – or a damp squib. It would not be until the twentieth century that the smile made what has proved to be a spectacular comeback. This was initially a slow process, but the twentieth-century Smile Revolution was complete by the middle decades of the century. As with its predecessor in the eighteenth century, it was a complex phenomenon which involved social and cultural as well as scientific and technological changes. France was not in the vanguard of change as it had been earlier. Now, particularly in the later stages, the USA led the way.

The virtual prohibition on the use of the white-tooth smile in western portraiture had been ended by Madame Vigée Le Brun in 1787. The smile did thereafter feature in portraits, as we have suggested, but it was still very much a minority taste. And it remained very heavily gendered. Women might occasionally be shown with white-tooth smiles, but this was still invariably seen as an unbecoming gesture for males. In France, no artistic movement embraced white teeth as wholeheartedly as, for example, the Pre-Raphaelites in England. Oddly, the artistic movements which did highlight the open mouth in their art, following the wake of Edvard Munch's *The Scream* (1893), were the expressionists, the Dadaists, and the Surrealists. For them, the open mouth and the display of teeth were more likely to be linked to the grimace, the Democritan smile of mockery, or the gaping Gothic hole.

Taken overall, the upshot of Le Brun's work was to endorse the convention that, in Western art, if one wanted to be portrayed pleasantly smiling (as opposed to laughing), then it was best to smile like Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa*. Her smile – which, though admired, was not in fact a great favourite in Enlightenment France – had been gracious, genteel, controlled and mild. The *Mona Lisa* was not alone in smiling, but she was also best minded to keep her mouth firmly shut. For individuals to have their mouths open in a painting in Western art, back to Antiquity, generally signified that, if they were not in the grip of extreme passion, they were plebeian or insane. The dark, forbidding facial orifices of beggars, gypsies, strolling players, and other social marginals portrayed by Caravaggio, Georges de La Tour, Velazquez, and others fitfully generate a sense of menace.

England's Queen Victoria was famously "not amused", and her official portraits are certainly very glum. In fact, in 1843, she commissioned the German court artist Franz-Xaver Winterhalter to paint an intimate portrait of her to present as a special gift to her new husband, Prince Albert. She chose to be represented in reclining fashion, smiling charmingly, and displaying her teeth. This probably makes her the first European monarch to wear the Vigée Le Brun smile in a portrait. Yet the circumstances of the commission were significant. Victoria made the painting a personal gift to Albert, and hung it in their private suite. It was never seen publicly in her lifetime.

Only right at the very end of the nineteenth century were teeth and smiles timidly finding their way more evidently into painted portraits. Interestingly, it seems to have been female artists, such as Berthe Morisot and Mary Cassatt, who gave lead to this. The pace of change was initially slower in regard to photographic portraiture. Strangely perhaps, given the new medium's more naturalistic, even documentary potential, white teeth failed to establish themselves in photography in the nineteenth century. There were technical reasons for this. For all of the nineteenth century, and especially during the early days, posing times were long (thirty minutes at first). In the 1860s and 1870s, sitters frequently wore neck-braces, arm-bands, and waist-restrainers to ensure stillness. Even when the exposure time was reduced to a minute or less, this still removed the possibility of anything like instantaneousness or spontaneity in capturing identities. The possibility of a wide smile morphing into a smirk or a rictus was still present.

In the event, the emergence of new cultural models was needed to stimulate change. In the eighteenth century, the cult of sensibility had acted as a trigger: people wanted to cry and smile like their novelistic heroes and heroines. In the early twentieth century, new media took this path-breaking emulative role. Of prime importance was film and the associated medium of studio photography. More even than novels, film encouraged processes of identification with the lifestyle and self-presentation of celebrity or fantasy figures. Before the First World War, film studios in Hollywood started to make the posed images of their stars into media outputs with mass appeal. The smile was gradually becoming a key feature of this new medium.

Where film-stars led the way, private individuals followed, particularly in the inter-war period. Even some politicians began to go with the flow. By the beginning of the Second World War, the practice of saying "cheese" in front of camera had begun. The display of teeth in photography was becoming the norm for those who watched films as much as for those who starred in them.

The triumph of the twentieth-century Smile Revolution stimulated a postmodernist response in the early 1960s to the emergent Smile Revolution. Andy Warhol's ironically flat depiction in 1962 of thirty-two Campbell's soup cans satirized art practice and taste as much as it did the mindless replicability of advertising images. Warhol added an extra twist in his Marilyn Monroe diptych, also in 1962. A witty commentary on the times, the work highlighted how the smile of this highly individualistic and charismatic film star was just as replicable as a can soup.

Jones, C. (2017). *The Smile Revolution in eighteenth-century Paris*. Oxford University Press, with adaptations.

Write a summary of the text in your own words.

Text length: up to 50 lines
[value: 15.00 points]

INSTRUÇÕES PARA AS PROVAS DISCURSIVAS

PROVA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

Orientações para a elaboração dos textos das provas discursivas.

- A prova de língua inglesa é composta por 1 (um) tema de redação; 1 (um) texto em inglês – para tradução para a língua portuguesa; 1 (um) texto em português – para elaboração de versão em inglês; e 1 (um) texto em língua inglesa – para elaboração de resumo em inglês.
- A prova deverá ser manuscrita, em letra legível, com caneta esferográfica de tinta preta, fabricada com material transparente, e as respostas deverão ser transcritas para as folhas de texto definitivo.
- As **folhas de texto definitivo** das provas discursivas não poderão ser assinadas, rubricadas e nem conter, em outro local que não o apropriado, nenhuma palavra ou marca que identifique o candidato, sob pena de anulação da prova.
- As **folhas de texto definitivo** são os únicos documentos válidos para a avaliação das provas discursivas.
- O candidato receberá 6 (seis) folhas de texto definitivo das provas discursivas, sendo 2 (duas) para a redação, 1 (uma) para a tradução, 1 (uma) para a versão e 2 (duas) para o resumo. As folhas de texto definitivo indicarão se pertencem à redação, à tradução, à versão ou ao resumo. O candidato deverá observar atentamente a correspondência entre redação, tradução, versão e resumo e folha de texto definitivo, sob pena de ter o seu texto avaliado negativamente.
- O espaço para rascunho, contido no caderno de provas, é de preenchimento facultativo e não valerá para avaliação das provas discursivas.
- A resposta para a redação deverá ter extensão mínima de 45 (quarenta e cinco) linhas e máxima de 50 (cinquenta) linhas. O resumo deverá contemplar de 35% a 50% do texto em até 50 (cinquenta) linhas.
- Será apenas a redação que desobedecer à extensão mínima ou máxima de linhas, deduzindo-se, da pontuação atribuída à redação, **1,0 (um)** para cada linha que faltar para atingir o mínimo ou que exceder o máximo exigido.
- Inicie, impreterivelmente, o seu texto na linha identificada como número 1 na página inicial da folha de texto definitivo.

COMPOSITION

Read the following texts carefully.

Text 1

How can he explain to him? The world is not run from where he thinks. Not from his border fortresses, not even from Whitehall. The world is run from Antwerp, from Florence, from places he has never imagined; from Lisbon, from where the ships with sails of silk drift west and are burned up in the sun. Not from castle walls, but from counting houses, not by the call of the bugle but by the click of the abacus, not by the grate and click of the mechanism of the gun but by the scrape of the pen on the page of the promissory note that pays for the gun and the gunsmith and the powder and shot.

Mantel, Hilary. (2010) *Wolf Hall*: a novel. Picador, p. 349.

Text 2

[Diplomats] need to understand JPMorgan Chase or Google's diplomatic machinery in the way that they understand China's. They should be competing with the best technology they can lay their hands on. They should be on a digital war footing.

I often ask people who they think will have the greatest influence on the twenty-first century – Google or Britain? Increasingly, most say Google. I want to show in this book how they can be proved wrong. Google has been a technological superpower for a decade. Britain has been one for at least 250 years.

Fletcher, Tom. (2017) William Collins, p. 17, with adaptations.

Discuss whether and to what extent technological and economic changes over the past few decades have transformed the intrinsic nature of diplomacy and (or) international politics. Draw connections between the ideas in the two texts.

Text length: 45 to 50 lines
[value: 50,00 points]

Read the following text carefully.

The train bore me away, through the monstrous scenery. This was March, but the weather had been horribly cold and everywhere there were mounds of blackened snow. As we moved slowly through the outskirts of the town we passed row after row of little grey slum houses running at right angles to the embankment. At the back of one of the houses a young woman was kneeling on the stones, poking a stick up the leaden waste-pipe which ran from the sink inside and which I suppose was blocked. I had time to see everything about her – her coarse apron, her clumsy boots, her arms reddened by the cold. She looked up as the train passed, and I was almost near enough to catch her eye. She had a round pale face, the usual exhausted face of the slum girl who is twenty-five and looks forty, thanks to miscarriages and drudgery; and it wore, for the second in which I saw it, the most desolate, hopeless expression I have ever seen. It struck me then that we are mistaken when we say that “It isn’t the same for them as it would be for us”, and that people bred in the slums can imagine nothing but the slums. For what I saw in her face was not the ignorant suffering of an animal. She knew well enough what was happening to her – understood as well as I did how dreadful a destiny it was to be kneeling there in the bitter cold, on the slimy stone of a slum backyard, poking a stick up a foul drain-pipe.

Orwell, George. (1972) *The Road to Wigan Pier*. Mariner Books. pp. 20-1, with adaptations.

Translate this excerpt into Portuguese.

[value: 20,00 points]

Read the following text carefully.

A literatura brasileira construiu uma concepção do Brasil, projetando a visão que temos de nós, a maneira como nos compreendemos e nos representamos. É uma concepção plural, e nisso reside sua força e vigor – que é literário, cultural e político. A pluralidade é resultado do empenho por meio do qual projetos minoritários de Brasil foram expressos e preservados. A questão é: qual o sentido desses projetos ainda hoje? Projetos alternativos coexistem, na maioria das vezes, em condição de inferioridade, com o projeto de Brasil elaborado e levado a cabo pelas elites. Considera-se, também, que os projetos das elites ganham significado maior quando percebemos neles contradições, ou seja, quando neles percebemos as vozes das classes oprimidas. Enquanto houver contradição, convém dizer, o empenho continua, a História também.

Os antecessores de Machado de Assis tentavam ver o Brasil com os olhos europeus, indicando os caminhos para que o País pudesse acertar o passo com o progresso da civilização. Machado inverte o olhar: a Europa civilizada passa a ser vista pela ótica brasileira. Quando Machado publica suas obras fundamentais, a formação do sistema literário brasileiro se completa. Entenda-se por isso: produz as primeiras grandes obras de valor estético universal. Sendo um escritor identificado com os valores cosmopolitas, que desqualificou a busca da cor local como caminho para a excelência literária, sua obra, entretanto, está ancorada no ponto de vista local. Só que, agora, local já não é sinônimo de pitoresco, é aquele sentimento íntimo do tempo e da História.

BASTOS, Hermenegildo. *In: Cerrados*. Revista do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Literatura, n. 21, ano 15, 2006, p. 91-112, com adaptações.

Translate this excerpt into English.

[value: 15,00 points]

Read the following text carefully.

After the close of the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico, United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick unleashed a stinging attack on Brazil and its Latin American partners in the G-20 trade negotiating coalition. Lamenting the failure to reach agreement on the US/EU proposal to conclude the Doha round, Zoellick (2003) criticized Brazil's "tactics of confrontation", refusal to compromise and insistence on a "massive list of required changes" to the chairperson's discussion text. The tension between the Brazilian-led G-20 negotiating coalition and the US offers a highly illustrative point to initiating a discussion on contemporary Latin American diplomacy.

CHANGING TRADITIONAL VIEWS: LATIN AMERICA IS NOT A HOMOGENOUS ENTITY

Perhaps the cleverest element of Zoellick's blast against Brazil was the emphasis on how the G-20 not only violated pan-Southern solidarity by rejecting a text from the Thai WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi, but also invalidated the supposedly rooted idea of intra-Latin American unity. As Zoellick highlighted, the text blocked by the G-20 was drafted by the WTO's General Council chairperson Carlos Pérez del Castillo, Uruguay's ambassador to the organization. In his ire, Zoellick appeared to be assuming Latin America can be viewed as a homogeneous unit with consistent shared interests and attitudes. The region is instead comprised of countries possessing a wide range of geographic, demographic, economic and historical characteristics impacting their independent foreign policy positions. "Latin America" as a "unity" is itself an externally devised notion promoted by the French in the 1830s in an effort to create an implicit sense of alliance between the region and Romance-language European countries engaged in a struggle with their Anglo-Saxon and Slavic neighbors. The French idea of "Latin America" as a contiguous unit did stick in the Washington policy consciousness during the 1800s when gunboat diplomacy sustained US efforts to establish the Western Hemisphere as its exclusive zone of influence.

While there has been important variation in how Washington has attempted to manage the different countries, the general tone and approach has started from a remarkably similar place whether the US counterpart was Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica or Mexico. Even the regional organizations spanning the hemisphere, such as the Organization of American States, have been seen as opportunistic tools for Washington, not forums within which to engage in serious problem-solving or issue management. Per the tradition initiated with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, Latin America has remained a question of bilateral management and control for Washington (HAKIM, 2006).

The combination of somewhat comparable histories of Iberian colonization, geographic continuity on a common continental land mass, similarities in language – Brazilian diplomats speak fluent Spanish –, as well as an absence of serious inter-state armed conflict helps to build a sense that the region is harmonious and relatively homogenous. Overlooked in this surface-level sketch is the persistence of rooted tensions and conflicts in the region. Brazil and Mexico have soft contending ambitions for regional leadership, with Argentina often staking its own claim as well. The Bolivian armed forces are led by an admiral as a sustained note of protest against what it claims as Chile's illegal seizure of its coastal provinces during the 1879–83 War of the Pacific. Peru, too, has border complaints against Chile from that nineteenth century war and only recently settled an additional border conflict with Ecuador in 1998, a dispute which dated from 1942 and saw a series of conflicts and casualties throughout the twentieth century.

If we expand the list of territorial disputes in the region to include trade disagreements, political contretemps, historical misunderstandings and other forms of regional rivalry, we end up with a fairly extensive catalogue of dissent and discord in Latin America. What matters for understanding Latin American diplomacy is that these very real disagreements have a tendency to become of second-order importance to regional diplomats when faced with the need to unify in the face of pressure from a US or Europe that either dismissively tries to aggregate the region into a single, easy to manage unit, or pursues a strategy of divide and conquer to maintain implicit and explicit dominance. This pressure has had a major influence on how Latin American countries approach diplomacy and how they self-consciously exploit the externally created identity of Latin America.

NOT QUITE UNITY, NOT QUITE COALITION

Thanks to an accommodative and legalistic predilection for talking through disagreements, Latin America has become notable for the absence of inter-state conflicts. Although there are unsolved disputes in the region, resolution is consistently sought through negotiation and arbitration, not armed invasion. Even when conflict has erupted, the tensions appear reluctant and are quickly brought to the negotiating table by other regional countries.

Perhaps the best theorizing of the lack of inter-state armed hostility within Latin America can be found in the *concertación* approach to diplomatic management advanced by Argentine scholar Federico Merke (2015). The term *concertación* has no simple translation into English, being a reflection of an Ibero-American tradition of managing difference and dissent in politics such that it can become a strength rather than source of discord. At the heart lies an informally institutionalized process of summitry and discussion in lieu of power politics. Escalation in Latin American terms means the convocation of presidential diplomacy to discuss the matter of dissent, not the deployment of military forces to border regions. More significantly, it is often not just the presidents of the directly affected countries that meet, but rather the region's leadership or a delegated sub-grouping of ministers or national presidents.

Although there are a series of semi-regular presidential summits through groupings such as UNASUR, MERCOSUR, CELAC and so on, the *concertación* process is not rooted in a formalized framework, but rather exists as a convention embedded in the region's shared legalistic approach to international affairs. Chief amongst the legal norms driving *concertación* are the interlinked principles of sovereignty and nonaggression. Although precise interpretations are debated, there is cross-national agreement in Latin America that respect of international law is essential for mutual security and that great emphasis should be placed upon setting and observing the rules. The depth of *concertación* strategies of avoiding military conflict have been highlighted over the last fifteen years as substantial increases in military expenditure by many regional countries have resulted in increases in mutual confidence, not a rise of distrust-fueled arms races (VILLA; WEIFFEN, 2014).

Burges, Sean; Chagas Bastos, Fabrício. Latin American Diplomacy. In: Constantinou, Costas; Kerr, Pauline; Sharp, Paul (Orgs.). (2016) *The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy*. London: Sage Publications Ltd., with adaptations.

Write a summary of the text in your own words using up to 50 lines.

Text length: up to 50 lines
[value: 15,00 points]

PROVA ESCRITA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

- Nesta prova, faça o que se pede, utilizando, caso deseje, os espaços indicados para rascunho. Em seguida, escreva os textos definitivos da redação e dos exercícios da prova escrita de Língua Inglesa no **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. Respeite o limite máximo de linhas disponibilizado, pois qualquer fragmento de texto além desse limite será desconsiderado. No **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, utilize apenas caneta esferográfica de tinta preta, fabricada em material transparente.
- Na avaliação da redação, será atribuído à organização do texto e ao desenvolvimento do tema o valor máximo de **25,00 pontos**, e à correção gramatical e à propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **25,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **50,00 pontos** possíveis. Será atribuída nota **zero** à redação **que não se ativer ao tema**.
- Será aplicada a redação que desobedecer aos limites mínimo ou máximo de palavras, deduzindo-se da pontuação atribuída à redação **0,10 ponto** para cada palavra que faltar para atingir o mínimo ou que exceder o máximo estabelecidos.
- Na avaliação da tradução de texto do inglês para o português, será atribuído à fidelidade ao estilo do texto original o valor máximo de **5,00 pontos**, e à correção gramatical e à propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **15,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **20,00 pontos** possíveis.
- Na avaliação da versão de texto do português para o inglês, será atribuído à fidelidade ao estilo do texto original o valor máximo de **5,00 pontos**, e à correção gramatical e à propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **10,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **15,00 pontos** possíveis.
- Na avaliação do resumo, em inglês, a partir de texto escrito em língua inglesa, será atribuído à capacidade de síntese e concisão o valor máximo de **5,00 pontos**, e à correção gramatical e à propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **10,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **15,00 pontos** possíveis.

REDAÇÃO

When the statesmen who took Europe to war in 1914 came to write their memoirs, they agreed on one thing: that war had been inevitable — the result of such vast historical forces that no human agency could have prevented it. “The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war,” wrote David Lloyd George in a famous passage in his **War Memoirs**. Nor was this the only metaphor he employed to convey the vast, impersonal forces at work...

Niall Ferguson. **Why the World Went to War**. Penguin, 2005, p. 1 (adapted).

In light of the quote above, comment on the conclusion the statesmen had come to, regarding the inevitability of the First World War. Mention and explain some of the circumstances that induced them individually to arrive at such a common judgement.

Extensão: 400 a 450 palavras

[valor: 50,00 pontos]

Translate the following excerpt into Portuguese.

[valor: 20,00 pontos]

Consider the subtleness of the sea; how its most dreaded creatures glide under water, unapparent for the most part, and treacherously hidden beneath the loveliest tints of azure. Consider also the devilish brilliance and beauty of many of its most remorseless tribes, as the dainty embellished shape of many species of sharks. Consider, once more, the universal cannibalism of the sea; all whose creatures prey upon each other, carrying on the eternal war since the world began. Consider all this; and then turn to this green, gentle, and most docile earth; consider them both, the sea and the land; and do you not find a strange analogy to something in yourself? For as this appalling ocean surrounds the verdant land, so in the soul of man there lies one insular Tahiti, full of peace and joy, but surrounded by all the horrors of the half-known life. God keep thee! Push not off from that isle, thou canst never return!

Herman Melville. **Moby Dick**. Penguin books, 1994 (adapted).

Translate the following excerpt into English.

[valor: 15,00 pontos]

Nenhum povo está mais distante dessa noção ritualista da vida do que o brasileiro. Nossa forma ordinária de relações sociais é fundamentalmente o oposto de polidez. Ela pode iludir na aparência, e isso se explica pelo fato de a atitude polida consistir precisamente em uma espécie de mímica deliberada de manifestações que são espontâneas no “homem cordial”; é a forma natural e viva convertida em fórmula. Além disso a polidez é, de algum modo, uma organização da defesa ante a sociedade. Está na parte exterior, superficial do indivíduo, podendo mesmo servir, quando necessário, de meio de resistência. Equivale a um disfarce que permitirá a cada um de nós preservar intatas nossa sensibilidade e emoções.

Por meio de semelhante padronização das formas exteriores da cordialidade, que não precisam ser legítimas para se manifestarem, revela-se um decisivo triunfo do espírito. Armado dessa máscara, o indivíduo mantém sua supremacia ante a sociedade. Com efeito, a polidez implica uma presença contínua e soberana do indivíduo.

Sérgio Buarque de Holanda. **Raízes do Brasil**. 26.ª ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995, p. 147 (com adaptações).

Write a summary **in your own words (280 minimum to 400 maximum)** of the following text.

[valor: 15,00 pontos]

People have huge amounts of information to deal with. How do you do this as diplomats? Do you keep it close to your chest? Does information mean power? Or do you share the information with the network in which you are increasingly operating? The playing field is changing very rapidly, partly as a result of digitalisation.

Operating in a network

I used to tell my students that 90% of diplomatic information was in the public domain, but the figure is even higher now. Of course, confidentiality, and even secrecy, are important in diplomacy, particularly when it comes to matters like peace and security. However, diplomatic success depends increasingly on collaboration with others. Collaboration takes place in networks, which are becoming increasingly digital. The rules are not the same as in your own diplomatic circles, where you know roughly how your counterparts work, whatever country they come from. In a network you are not merely an official representative of a government; what defines you more is probably the information you bring to the network. That kind of added value is what people are judged on. That is what you are worth. It is a changing playing field through which information now flows much faster, via your network. And that network is what you rely on.

Role of social media

Everyone immediately thinks of people like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi or US President Barack Obama, who practise “Twiplomacy” — diplomacy via Twitter. Social media make things more personal and bring people who traditionally operate in the shadows into the limelight, giving an ambassador a face. You can find out what they are doing by following them on their social media account. People also get more “digital personality”. You can be sure that political leaders are cultivating this quite carefully.

It’s still the early days. Institutions and individuals still have to adjust and find their voice in the digital age. They are wondering what exactly to do on Twitter. What should they say? A personal note must also serve their professional goals. My opinion is that, in reality, diplomats, who have always been quite focused on their own professional group, might continue in the same vein on social media. Meanwhile, it is important to remember that there are different ways of using social media. We often assume that you interact with those around you on social media. You make sure you tweet every day, you join the conversation. But diplomats also use it passively, following what’s happening. It’s a useful tool that allows you to discover things you might not otherwise find, or at least not as quickly. So, in fact you see a conservative diplomat using new media on a new information playing field in the same way as an intelligence officer.

Fine to make mistakes

The motto at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used to be “Call DVL!”, the former Information and Communication Department. Wherever you were and whatever happened, if you were approached by the media, you just had to say “Call DVL!”. But that’s all ancient history. The information environment is much more open now, and the people at the embassies have much more freedom to take the initiative. They need background material to give their own account. In this age of social media, we accept that people might make mistakes, and then simply admit it. That’s new. It used to be fatal for your career if you made a mistake. That created a professional culture in which the approach to providing information was extremely conservative. This is all changing, things are gradually becoming more open. The question is no longer “What can we release?”, but “What do we really need to keep secret?”. An essential difference.

New winners

Excellence in terms of responding to the digital environment is partly the preserve of the “usual suspects”, like the US and the UK. But Estonia, India, Kosovo and tech champions like South Korea are also responding well. All aspects of diplomatic work can benefit: searching for information, collaborating with others, explaining what you do, negotiating, how open you can be with the outside world. This question of information is increasingly important. Digitisation is also about the modernisation of diplomacy, becoming more experimental, seeing the network more as the starting point. Questions about digitalisation will then automatically find their way onto the agenda. There are in fact only a few countries that take a holistic view. Digital transformation is a trend in the business world, but it is much less so in the public sector. The reality is that many countries simply do not have the capacity. You can perform a conceptual analysis of the impact of big data, but that is only the start of the challenge. It is also a matter of focus. Like in Estonia and Kosovo, where they are thinking creatively about how communications technology and digital technology can help them achieve what they want with few resources.

PROVA ESCRITA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

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- Será apenas a redação que desobedecer à extensão mínima ou máxima de palavras, deduzindo-se, da pontuação atribuída à redação ou ao exercício, **0,10 ponto** para cada palavra que faltar para atingir o mínimo ou que exceder o máximo estabelecidos.
- Na avaliação da tradução de texto do inglês para o português, será atribuído à fidelidade ao estilo do texto original o valor máximo de **5,00 pontos**, e, à correção gramatical e propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **15,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **20,00 pontos** possíveis.
- Na avaliação da versão de texto do português para o inglês, será atribuído à fidelidade ao estilo do texto original o valor máximo de **5,00 pontos**, e, à correção gramatical e propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **10,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **15,00 pontos** possíveis.
- Na avaliação do resumo, em inglês, a partir de texto escrito em língua inglesa, será atribuído à capacidade de síntese e concisão o valor máximo de **5,00 pontos**, e, à correção gramatical e propriedade da linguagem, o valor máximo de **10,00 pontos**, o que totalizará os **15,00 pontos** possíveis.

COMPOSITION

Many commentators are of the opinion that this grouping of five large and populous emerging nations has the potential to influence the international system, as regards for instance the reform of the International Monetary Fund and the implementation of the Paris Convention. Others, however, point out that Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have their own separate diplomatic agendas, and that their differences will always make it impossible for the group to become a real force in world affairs. Nevertheless, the impact of the Trump presidency and the weakening of the post-Brexit European Union may open new perspectives for the BRICS.

In the light of the different opinions presented above, discuss if the BRICS can contribute to create a new world order.

(Length: 400 to 450 words)

[value: 50,00 marks]

Translate the following excerpt into Portuguese.

[value: 20,00 marks]

There were humans long before there was history. But for countless generations they did not stand out from the myriad other organisms with which they shared their habitats. On a hike in East Africa 2 million years ago, you might well have encountered a familiar cast of human characters: anxious mothers cuddling their babies and clutches of carefree children playing in the mud; temperamental youths chafing against the dictates of society and weary elders who just wanted to be left in peace; chest-thumping machos trying to impress the local beauty and wise old matriarchs who had already seen it all. Archaic humans loved, played, formed close friendships and competed for status and power — but so did chimpanzees, baboons and elephants. There was nothing special about humans. Nobody, least of all humans themselves, had any inkling that their descendants would one day walk on the moon, fathom the genetic code and write history books. The most important thing to know about prehistoric humans is that they were insignificant animals with no more impact on their environment than gorillas, fireflies or jellyfish.

Yuval Noah Harari. **Sapiens**. Harper, 2015 (adapted).

Translate into English the following excerpt.

[value: 15,00 marks]

Quem somos nós, os brasileiros, feitos de tantos e tão variados contingentes humanos? A fusão deles todos em nós já se completou, está em curso, ou jamais se concluirá? Estaremos condenados a ser para sempre um povo multicolorido no plano racial e no cultural? Haverá alguma característica distintiva dos brasileiros como povo, feito que está por gente vinda de toda parte? Todas estas arguições seculares têm já resposta clara encontrada na ação concreta.

Nesse campo de forças é que o Brasil se fez a si mesmo, tão oposto ao projeto lusitano e tão surpreendente para os próprios brasileiros. Hoje nos tornamos o que os lusos aqui nos juntaram, tanto os tijolos biorraciais como as argamassas socioculturais com que o Brasil vem-se fazendo.

Assim é que, embora embarcados num projeto alheio, nos viabilizamos ao nos afirmar contra aquele projeto oficial e ao nos opor aos desígnios do colonizador e de seus sucessores. Pela vontade deles, os índios, os negros e todos nós, mestiços deles, arrebanhados pela empresa colonial, prosseguiríamos na função que nos foi prescrita de serviços de ultramar, destinados a produzir mercadoria exportável, sem jamais chegar a ser gente com destino próprio.

Darcy Ribeiro. **O povo brasileiro – A formação e o sentido do Brasil**.
São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995, p. 246-7 (com adaptações).

Write a summary **in your own words** of the following excerpt.

[value: 15,00 marks]

The growing weight and importance given to the concept of soft power is a natural response to a rapidly changing global context. While it is hardly a new insight, it remains true that global geo-politics are in the midst of a fundamental transformation, throwing up a host of new challenges for leaders, policy makers, and diplomats. In terms of the importance of soft power, this shifting landscape is being driven by two megatrends. The first is the rise of networks as the driving force in global affairs. The second, and closely related trend, is the digital revolution, which means world events — large and small — increasingly play out online.

There are three main factors that are driving global affairs away from bilateral diplomacy and hierarchies and toward a much more complex world of networks. The first factor is the rapid diffusion of power between states. This century has seen the start of the global centre of economic and political power transfer from West to East. Whether it is the BRICS or whatever trendy acronym might come next, the “rise of the rest” has helped create a genuinely multi-polar world.

We have also seen the erosion of traditional power hierarchies. The nation state is no longer the only relevant actor in global affairs. At the same time power is moving from West to East, it is also shifting away from states altogether, as non-state actors — NGOs, multi-lateral organisations, corporations, civil society groups or even individuals — play increasingly significant roles and wield greater influence in world affairs.

The third agent of transformation is the mass urbanisation of the world's population. Only in the last few years has human history reached a point where the majority of people around the world live in cities. This trend will continue with the proportion of urban dwellers rising ever higher. Global urbanisation has implications for how information is shared, the diffusion of technology, cross-pollination of ideas, innovation, and the development of political movements. Moreover, cities themselves are becoming more assertive global actors in their own right. This trend challenges the primacy of the nation-state as the sole government actor in international relations. The rise of the city presents opportunities, but also illustrates the drift of power away from the nation state.

With more actors crowding the world stage and vying for influence, networks offer a means to coordinate interests, pool resources, and ultimately shape global outcomes. Border-spanning networks may comprise a diverse set of actors, drawing together governments and a range of non-government actors. They may form to tackle complex collective-action problems like climate change, or take up single issues like ending sexual violence in conflict zones. The life-span of such networks will vary by issue, but the speed with which they form and the ease with which they can now coordinate has made them a major factor in driving global change.

The second interlinked megatrend driving global change is that the world increasingly lives online. There are now over three billion internet users across the world, nearly half of the global population. Millions of transactions take place online every day, with news and entertainment increasingly delivered via web-based channels. More of day-to-day life has gone digital. There are now over two billion active social media accounts.

The growth in computing power, the speed with which information is disseminated around the globe, and the spread of the smartphone has transformed the way information is shared. The subsequent democratisation of access to information has created a more informed — and increasingly activist — global public. The combined effects of rapid technological advances on global events have been demonstrated in the Arab Spring, the rise of Wikileaks, the #Occupy movement, citizen-journalism, and even the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. The rapid movement of information across borders, and the proliferation of platforms to share that information, has made individuals more powerful than they have been at any point in history.

One important aspect of the digital world has been difficult for many heads of government, foreign ministries, and over-zealous state broadcasters to accept: propaganda as we know it is dead. Governments and their various interlocutors no longer have the luxury of offering domestic audiences one message whilst feeding another to the international community. Moreover, any discrepancy between a country's international messaging and its corresponding conduct is leapt on by media, governments, pressure groups, and individuals. With information speeding across borders, the inconsistencies between a state's policy and messaging are more conspicuous. In today's networked world of instant information, global publics are smarter, more engaged, and likely to dismiss propaganda when they see it.

Rather than maximising the opportunities this provides for genuine dialogue, we have unfortunately seen some governments respond to the threat to propaganda by creating a state-backed "troll army". The practice of employing people to create fake social media accounts to both harass dissenting opinion and try to shape debate on digital platforms is receiving increasing attention in Western media. There has, however, yet to be a comprehensive assessment of the effect such practices have on their target audiences.

For most Western governments, these two megatrends — and the challenges they present — have come at a time when the resources available to adapt to them have been reduced. Foreign ministries have not managed to avoid deep spending cuts as governments struggle to get their public finances back under control.

There have been considerable fund reductions in the budgets of public institutions that play a role in generating and projecting their country's soft power. This is worrying as the above trends will make the tools and approaches of soft power more, not less, important to achieving foreign policy objectives. Reducing soft power capabilities at a time when they are increasingly critical to achieving both security and prosperity objectives may well prove to be a false economy.

Jonathan McClory. **Why does soft power matter?** In: The Soft Power 30 Report, p. 11-2 (adapted).

PROVA ESCRITA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

Nesta prova, faça o que se pede, utilizando, caso deseje, os espaços indicados para rascunho. Em seguida, escreva os textos definitivos no **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, nos locais apropriados, pois não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos. Respeite o limite máximo de linhas disponibilizado para cada texto. Qualquer fragmento de texto além desse limite será desconsiderado. No **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, utilize apenas caneta esferográfica de tinta preta, fabricada em material transparente.

TRANSLATION – PART A

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt.

[value: 20 marks]

As you are reading these words, you are taking part in one of the wonders of the natural world. For you and I belong to a species with a remarkable ability: we can shape events in each other's brains with exquisite precision. I am not referring to telepathy or mind control or the other obsessions of fringe science; even in the depictions of believers these are blunt instruments compared to an ability that is uncontroversially present in every one of us. That ability is language. Simply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other's minds. The ability comes so naturally that we are apt to forget what a miracle it is.

In any natural history of the human species, language would stand out as the preeminent trait. To be sure, a solitary human is an impressive problem-solver and engineer. But what is truly arresting about our kind is better captured in the story of the Tower of Babel, in which humanity, speaking a single language, came so close to reaching heaven that God himself felt threatened.

Adapted from Steven Pinker. **The language instinct**. Penguin Books, 1995.

Translate into English the following text.

[value: 15 marks]

Com o fim da escravidão e a conseqüente desorganização momentânea do sistema de mão de obra, uma série de esforços foi feita no sentido de atrair imigrantes, sobretudo europeus, para o Brasil. A experiência vinha da época do Império, mas seria incrementada na Primeira República. Em razão da concorrência de países como Argentina, Cuba, México e Estados Unidos da América, o governo brasileiro teve de se esmerar para vender a ideia do “paraíso terreal”. Grandemente destinado ao campo — à formação de núcleos coloniais oficiais nos estados do Sul e em especial às fazendas de café na Região Sudeste —, esse contingente de imigrantes acabaria absorvido pela dinâmica das cidades que cresciam e ofereciam empregos e serviços.

Como existiam grandes áreas não ocupadas no Sul do país, instalou-se aí um modelo de imigração baseado em pequenas propriedades policultoras. A terra era vendida a prazo, em lotes de vinte a vinte e cinco hectares, geralmente distribuídos ao longo dos cursos de água. As propriedades eram, porém, muito isoladas, e seus novos habitantes sujeitos a todo tipo de adversidade: ataques de indígenas, maus-tratos por parte da população local, dificuldades de comércio.

Adapted from Lília M. Schwarcz and Heloisa M. Starling. **Brasil: uma biografia**. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2015.

SUMMARY

Write a summary, **in your own words**, of the following excerpt. Your text should not exceed **200 words**.

[value: 15 marks]

Economists are sometimes criticized for concentrating too much on efficiency and too little on equity. There may be some ground for complaint here, but it must also be noted that inequality has received attention from economists throughout the history of this discipline. Adam Smith, who is often thought of as “the Father of Modern Economics”, was deeply concerned with the gulf between the rich and the poor. Some of the social scientists and philosophers who are responsible for making inequality such a central subject of public attention were, in terms of substantive involvement, devoted economists, no matter what else they might also have been. In recent years, economics of inequality as a subject has flourished. This is not to deny that the focus on efficiency to the exclusion of other considerations is very evident in some works in economics, but economists as a group cannot be accused of neglecting inequality as a subject.

If there is a reason to grumble, it rests more on the relative importance that is attached, in much of economics, to inequality in a very narrow domain, viz. *income inequality*. This narrowness has the effect of contributing to the neglect of other ways of seeing inequality and equity, which has far-reaching bearing on the making of economic policy. Policy debates have indeed been distorted by overemphasis on income poverty and income inequality, to the neglect of deprivations that relate to other variables, such as unemployment, ill health, lack of education, and social exclusion. Unfortunately, the identification of economic inequality with income inequality is fairly common in economics, and the two are often seen as effectively synonymous. If you tell someone that you are working on economic inequality, it is quite standardly assumed that you are studying income distribution.

The distinction, however, between income inequality and economic inequality is important. Many of the criticisms of economic egalitarianism as a value or a goal apply much more readily to the narrow concept of income inequality than they do to the broader notions of economic inequality. For example, giving a larger share of income to a person with more needs can be seen as militating against the principle of equalizing incomes, but it does not go against the broader precepts of economic equality.

Empirically, the relationship between income inequality and inequality in other relevant spaces can be rather distant and contingent because of various economic influences other than income that affect inequalities in individual advantages and substantive freedoms. For example, in the higher mortality rates of African Americans vis-à-vis the much poorer Chinese, or Indians in Kerala, we see the influence of factors that run in the opposite direction to income inequality, and that involve public policy issues with strong economic components: the financing of health care and insurance, provision of public education, arrangements for local security and so on.

Mortality differences can, in fact, serve as an indicator of very deep inequities that divide races, classes and genders. Statistics on mortality rates as well as other deprivations (such as undernourishment or illiteracy) can directly present a picture of inequality and poverty in some crucial dimensions. This information can also be used to relate the extent of relative deprivation of women to the existing inequalities in opportunities (in earning outside income, in being enrolled in schools and so on). Thus both descriptive and policy issues can be addressed through this broader perspective on inequality and poverty in terms of capability deprivation.

Despite the crucial role of incomes in the advantages enjoyed by different persons, the relationship between income (and other resources), on the one hand, and individual achievements and freedoms, on the other, is neither constant nor in any sense automatic and irresistible. Different types of contingencies lead to systematic variations in the “conversion” of incomes into the distinct “functionings” we can achieve, and that affects the lifestyles we can enjoy. I have tried to illustrate the

different ways in which there can be systematic variations in the relationship between incomes earned and substantive freedoms (in the form of capability to lead lives that people have reason to value). The respective roles of personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives and distributions within the family have to receive the serious attention they deserve for the making of public policy.

The argument is sometimes made that income is a homogeneous magnitude, whereas capabilities are diverse. This sharp contrast is not entirely correct, in the sense that any income evaluation hides internal diversities with some special — and often heroic — assumptions. Also, interpersonal comparisons of real income give us no basis for interpersonal comparisons even of utility. To get from the comparison of the means in the form of income differences to something that can be claimed to be valuable in itself (such as well-being or freedom), we have to take note of circumstantial variations that affect the conversion rates. The presumption that the approach of income comparison is a more “practical” way of getting at interpersonal differences in advantages is hard to sustain.

Furthermore, the need to discuss the valuation of diverse capabilities in terms of public priorities is an asset, forcing us to make clear what the value judgments are in a field where value judgments cannot be — and should not be — avoided. Indeed, public participation in these valuational debates is a crucial part of the exercise of democracy and responsible social choice. In matters of public judgment, there is no real escape from the evaluative need for public discussion. That evasion becomes transparent when we supplement income and commodity data with information of other types (including matters of life and death).

The issue of public discussion and social participation is thus central to the making of policy in a democratic framework. The use of democratic prerogatives — both political liberties and civil rights — is a crucial part of the exercise of economic policy making itself, in addition to other roles it may have. In a freedom-oriented approach, participatory freedoms cannot but be central to public policy analysis.

Adapted from Amartya Sen. **Development as Freedom**.
New York: Anchor Books, 1999. p. 107-10.

COMPOSITION

You'll never have a quiet world till you knock the patriotism out of the human race.

George Bernard Shaw, Irish playwright (1856-1950).

Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right and always successful, right or wrong.

Stephen Decatur Jr., U.S. Commodore (1779-1820).

From the point of view of a diplomat, compare and discuss the views of patriotism expressed in the two quotes above.

(Length: 400 to 450 words)

[value: 50 marks]

PROVA ESCRITA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

Nesta prova, faça o que se pede, utilizando, caso deseje, os espaços indicados para rascunho. Em seguida, escreva os textos definitivos das questões no **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, nos locais apropriados, pois não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos. Respeite o limite máximo de linhas disponibilizado para cada questão. Qualquer fragmento de texto além desse limite será desconsiderado. No **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, utilize apenas caneta esferográfica de tinta preta, fabricada em material transparente.

TRANSLATION – PART A

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Sir Christopher Meyer's article **How to step down as an ambassador – with style**.

[value: 20 marks]

It was once the custom for British ambassadors to write a valedictory despatch at the end of their posting. In contrast to the utilitarian style of daily diplomatic reporting, ambassadors were expected to spread their wings with candid comment on the country they were leaving, larded, where the wit was willing, with humorously pungent observations on the character of the locals. The best were distributed throughout the diplomatic service for the enlightenment and amusement of its ranks.

These were usually pretty sensitive and might be construed as a slight abroad were their contents divulged beyond the Ministry's portals. Some missives were deemed so delicate that their circulation was restricted for fear of leaks. Bidding farewell Sir Ivor Roberts dared ask: "Can it be that in wading through the plethora of business plans, capability reviews, skills audits... we have forgotten what diplomacy is all about?"

Whether written with quill, typewriter or tablet, a key requirement has ever been the ability to render incisive judgment, with style and wit.

Christopher Meyer. **How to step down as an ambassador – with style**. *The Daily Telegraph*. August 7th 2015.

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Sérgio Buarque de Holanda's **Raízes do Brasil**.

[value: 15 marks]

A empreitada de implantação da cultura europeia em extenso território, dotado de condições naturais, se não adversas, francamente antagônicas à sua cultura milenar, é, nas origens da sociedade brasileira, o fato dominante e mais rico em consequências. Trazendo de países distantes nossas formas de convívio, nossas instituições, nossas ideias, e timbrando em manter tudo isso em ambiente muitas vezes refratário e hostil, somos ainda hoje uns desterrados em nossa terra. Podemos enriquecer nossa humanidade de aspectos novos e imprevistos, aperfeiçoar o tipo de civilização que representamos, mas todo o fruto de nosso trabalho ou de nossa preguiça parece participar de um sistema de evolução próprio de outro clima e outra paisagem.

É significativo termos recebido a herança proveniente de uma nação ibérica. Espanha e Portugal eram territórios-ponte pelos quais a Europa se comunicava com os outros mundos. Constituíam uma zona fronteira, de transição, menos carregada desse europeísmo que, não obstante, retinha como um patrimônio imprescindível.

Sérgio Buarque de Holanda. **Raízes do Brasil**. 3.^a ed. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1956, p. 15-16.

SUMMARY

Write a summary, **in your own words**, of the following excerpt adapted from Gaia Vince's **Humans have caused untold damage to the planet**. Your text should not exceed **200 words**.

[value: 15 marks]

The times in which we live are epoch-making. Literally. Such is the scale of the changes humans have wrought of late that our world has been altered beyond anything experienced hitherto. Our planet is now crossing a geological boundary, and we are the change-makers.

Millions of years from now, a stripe in the accumulated layers of rock on Earth's surface will reveal our human fingerprint, just as we can discern evidence of dinosaurs in rocks of the Jurassic, the explosion of life that marks the Cambrian or the glacial retreat scars of the Holocene. Our imprint will be revealed by species going extinct by the score, sharp changes in the oceans' chemistry, depletion of forests and encroachment of deserts, shrinking of glaciers and the sinking of islands. Geologists of the far future will detect in fossil records a diminishing array of wild animals offset by an upsurge of domesticates, the baleful effects of detritus such as aluminium drink cans and plastic carrier bags, and the noxious smudge of mining projects laying waste the oil sands of north-western Canada, revolving 30 billion tonnes of earth each year — twice the amount of sediment discharged from all the rivers in the world.

In acknowledgement that humanity has become a geophysical force on a par with the earth-shattering asteroids and planet-cloaking volcanoes that defined past eras, geologists are dubbing this new epoch the Anthropocene. Earth now ranks as a human planet. We determine whether a forest stands or is razed, whether species survive or become extinct, how and whither a river flows, the temperature of the atmosphere, even. We have become the most manifold big animal on Earth, followed by those we breed to feed and serve us. Nearly half the planet's land surface is now used to grow our food, and we control three-quarters of the world's fresh water. Prodigious times, indeed. In the tropics, coral reefs dwindle, ice melts apace at the poles while the oceans are emptying of fish at our doing. Entire islands are submerging under rising seas, just as naked new land emerges in the Arctic.

It has become the business of science journalists to take special note of reports on how the biosphere is changing, and research is hardly in short supply. Study after study plot changes in butterfly migrations, glacier melt rates, ocean nitrogen levels, wildfire frequency... all linked by a common theme: the impact of humans. Scientists have described the multifarious ways humans are affecting the natural world. Climate scientists tracking global warming have forewarned of deadly droughts, heatwaves and gathering sea-level rise. Conservation biologists have envisaged biodiversity collapse to the point of mass extinction; marine biologists deplore "of plastic garbage" roaming the seas; space scientists debate the destiny of all the junk up there menacing our satellites; ecologists denounce deforestation of the last intact rainforests; agro-economists raise the alarm about deserts engulfing vast tracts of fertile soil. Every new study hammers home the extent to which our world is changing. Humanity is shaking it up. And people across the globe can hardly be in any doubt about the environmental crises we set in motion. All this is deeply troubling, if not overwhelming.

Dire predictions abound as to our future on Earth. At the same time, nonetheless, we should not disparage our triumphs, our inventions and discoveries — how scientists find novel ways to improve plants, stave off disease, transport electricity and forge new materials. We can be an incredible force of and for nature. Humans have the power to heat the planet further or to cool it down, to eliminate species and to engineer new ones, to re-sculpt the terrestrial surface and to fashion its biology. No part of this planet is untouched by human hand — we have transcended natural cycles, altering physical, chemical and biological processes. We can craft new life in a test tube, resurrect extinct species or grow replacement body parts. We have invented robots to be our drudges, computers to expand our brains, and a new ecosystem of communication networks. We have redrawn our own evolutionary pathway with medical advances that save those who would otherwise die in infancy. We are supernatural: we can fly without wings and dive without gills; we can survive killer diseases and be resuscitated after death.

The realisation that we wield such planetary power requires a major shift in perception, one that topples the scientific, cultural and religious philosophies that define our place in the world, in time and in relation to all other known life. Man was once framed at the centre of the Universe. Then came Copernicus in the 16th century, who put Earth in its place as just another planet revolving around the Sun. By the 19th century, Darwin had reduced man to just another species — a wee twig on the grand tree of life. The paradigm has swung round again, though: man is no longer just another species. We are the first to knowingly reshape the Earth's biology and chemistry. We have become vital to the destiny of life on Earth. The Anthropocene throws up unprecedented challenges, as we have already begun to tilt global processes out of kilter. In some cases, minuscule further changes could spell disaster; in others, a fair degree of leeway remains before we face the consequences.

The self-awareness implicit in recognising our power requires us to question our new-found role. Are we just another part of nature, doing what nature does: reproducing to the limits of environmental capacity, subsequently to suffer a sudden demise? Or shall we prove the first species capable of curbing its natural urges, and modulating its impact on the environment, such that habitability on Earth can be maintained? Should we treat the rest of the biosphere as an exploitable resource to be plundered at will for our pleasures and needs, or does our new global power imbue us with a sense of responsibility over the rest of the natural world? The Anthropocene — and our very future — will be defined by how we reconcile these opposing, interwoven drives in the years to come.

Gaia Vince. **Humans have caused untold damage to the planet.**
The Guardian. September 25th 2015. In: <www.theguardian.com>.

COMPOSITION

History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions and so on, like fish on the fish monger's slab. The historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him. Acton, whose culinary tastes were austere, wanted them served plain. In his letter of instructions to contributors to the first Cambridge Modern History, he announced the requirement "that our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, German and Dutch alike".

E. H. Carr. **What is history?** 2nd Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987, p. 9 (adapted).

When history is mobilised for specific political projects and sectarian conflicts; when political and community sentiments of the present begin to define how the past has to be represented; when history is fabricated to constitute a communal sensibility, and a politics of hatred and violence, we [historians] need to sit up and protest. If we do not, then the long night will never end. History will reappear again and again, not just as nightmare but as relived experience, re-enacted in endless cycles of retribution and revenge, in gory spectacles of blood and death.

Neeladri Bhattacharya, quoted in Willaim Dalrymple. **Trapped in the ruins.** *The Guardian*. March 20th 2004.

Compare and discuss the views of history expressed in the two quotes above, illustrating your discussion with appropriate examples.

(Length: 400 to 450 words)

[value: 50 marks]

PROVA ESCRITA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

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- Será penalizado, em cada parte da prova, o texto que não atender aos limites de palavras estabelecidos.

TRANSLATION – PART A

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from George Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia".

[value: 20 marks]

In winter on the Zaragoza front, except at night, when a surprise attack was always conceivable, nobody bothered about the enemy. They were merely remote black insects whom one occasionally glimpsed hopping to and fro. The prime concern of both sides was essaying to keep warm. The things one normally associates with the horrors of war seldom raised their ugly heads. Up in the hills it was simply the mingled boredom and discomfort of stationary warfare. A life as uneventful as a city clerk's, and almost as regular. Atop each hill, knots of ragged, grimy men shivering round their flag. And all day and night, the senseless bullets and shells wandering across the empty valleys and only by some fluke getting home on a human body.

I would gaze round the wintry landscape marveling at the futility, the inconclusiveness of such a kind of war. Could you forget that every mountain-top was occupied by troops and thus littered with tin cans and crusted with dung, the scenery was stupendous.

George Orwell. **Homage to Catalonia**. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, pp. 25-26.

TRANSLATION – PART B

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Foreign Minister Celso Lafer's lecture at Instituto Rio Branco in April 2001.

[value: 15 marks]

O novo ambiente internacional e seus cenários de conflito tornaram inadequadas as doutrinas de dissuasão nuclear e do "equilíbrio do terror", e, assim, passaram a ser ainda mais difíceis de justificar a retenção e o desenvolvimento de arsenais nucleares. Se aparentemente amainaram os riscos de uma conflagração atômica na escala contemplada à época da guerra fria, seguramente aumentaram os perigos difusos da violência de natureza descontrolada. Tais perigos aumentaram em função de uma faceta da globalização, que faz funcionar o mundo através de diversos tipos de redes. Entre estas estão as das finanças, que possibilitam, além dos movimentos rápidos dos fluxos de capital, a "lavagem" do dinheiro; as do crime organizado; as do tráfico de armas e de drogas; as do terrorismo; as das migrações clandestinas de pessoas, causadas por guerras e perseguições. No caso do Brasil, em função da porosidade das fronteiras, esses riscos provêm, em parte, do impacto interno, no território nacional, de fatores externos.

Celso Lafer. *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*. Número 88, 1.º semestre de 2001, MRE, p. 106.

SUMMARY

Write a summary, **in no more than 200 words**, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael S. Lunds's 1995 Foreign Affairs article "Underrating Preventive Diplomacy".

[value: 15 marks]

The malaise of U.S. foreign policy is such that academic gadflies now debunk any proposal sounding suspiciously positive. The charge is that proponents of preventive diplomacy oversell its potential, and naive policymakers are taking the bait. It is argued that problems of prescience, policy prescription, and political support mean the "intractable" conflicts "endemic" to the post-Cold War period cannot be averted unless major resources are invested in situations in which risks are high and success doubtful. Preventive diplomacy, the contention runs, merely means that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

Scaremongers conjure up a nightmare in which zealous purveyors of preventive diplomacy mesmerize unwitting policymakers into buying a discount antidote for local quagmires, one with little potency and hidden side effects. Yet responsible proponents of preventive diplomacy obviously do not presume easy solutions to such disasters can be found, nor do they advise key players to do something, just anything, in dealing with incipient conflicts, tout preventive diplomacy as a cure-all with no cost or risk, or assume no value judgments need be made. Not only do the scaremongers distort the views being expressed but they insult policymakers by implying they would fall for such policy nostrums.

Advocacy of a policy slogan is confounded with adoption of the substance behind it. The fact that preventive diplomacy is a buzzword of foreign policy does not imply that early warning and conflict prevention have become official doctrine or standard operating procedure. The term "preventive diplomacy" refers to actions or institutions that are used to keep political disputes arising between or within nations from escalating into armed force. These efforts are needed when and where existing international relations or national politics fail to manage tensions without violence erupting. They come into play before a point of confrontation, sustained violence, or military action is reached.

The claim is that while we know the societal conditions that stoke the chances of war or state collapse (e.g., poverty, environmental degradation, ethnic and economic divisions, and repressive, corrupt regimes, and so forth), murky individual and group decisions make it impossible to predict exactly when and where violence will surface. But just because political forecasting is not rocket science does not disqualify it. Unheralded acts, such as a military coup or a terrorist bombing, are very difficult to forecast. Early-warning specialists are, though, making progress in pinning down the probable precipitants of more gradual, phenomena such as ethnic conflict, genocide, and the breakdown of states. Demonstrations, repressive measures, hate rhetoric, arms build-ups, separatist communities forming parallel institutions: these signs one ignores at one's peril.

In Estonia, for example, restrictive citizenship and language laws adopted in 1993 by the newly-independent government were perceived by resident Russian speakers — then a third of Estonia's population — as discriminatory and threatening. Mindful of this group's powerful patron next door, the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other governmental and private actors took preventive steps to allay tensions.

The rub, so the argument runs, lies in knowing what actions to take. But preventive strategy is not the stab in the dark some observers insinuate. The blanket view that ethnic tensions uniformly lead to intractable conflicts is based on a few recent instances where, despite efforts to avoid it, violence has ensued: Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. One should look, instead, at the numerous ethnic and national disputes deemed potentially destabilizing and menacing that were actually managed in relative peace: Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, the break-up of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Congo's transition from autocracy, Zambia's non-violent shift toward democracy, and Hungary's moderated relations with its neighbors, among others. Such success stories are virtually ignored. Only two policy options ("little more than talking" or armed force) are mooted, whereas governments and NGOs have resorted to a gamut of measures to influence parties in disputes.

One may well be skeptical that preventive action would save more lives, cost less, and obviate the need for humanitarian intervention. No need, still, to go to the opposite extreme, wherein the financial and political cost of preventing such crises is prohibitive. The logic of conflict escalation is prima facie support for the view that less violent and short-lived disputes offer much greater opportunities for peaceful management by mediators. Issues in those types of disputes tend to be simple and singular, disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized, fatalities (and thus passions) are low, and communications and common institutions may have survived. Other states or external groups are less likely to have taken sides and may even share an interest in keeping local disputes from burgeoning.

The calculus of deciding whether preventive diplomacy is worth the price must comprehend the costs of alternatives such as mid-conflict intervention and non-involvement. That covers not only lives lost and injuries but also the price of humanitarian relief, refugee aid, and peacekeeping. It should also include the cost of losses in health, education, infrastructure, trade and investment opportunities, and natural resources.

The feeling is that the public will not endorse preventive diplomacy's risks and costs, but the considerations described above cast the issue of "political will" in a different light. Preventive efforts are often much less challenging and more prosaic than cases in which a government must endeavor to rouse the country to expose troops to possible danger abroad. For example, the dispatch of 500 American soldiers to join the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Macedonia was hardly noticed. Were preventive diplomacy to prosper, incipient conflicts would not even reach the desks of the National Security Council, the State Department's upper echelons, and the Pentagon.

Rather than ignore potential crises and threats out of some unexamined theory of their imagined intractability, policymakers might prudently track emerging political disputes around the world and develop policy options for addressing them promptly as opposed to belatedly. That would enable decision-makers to better assess whether they should act, when, with what means, and with whom. As successes mount, the burden of proof will shift to those who would still defend the notion that current wait-and-see policies and practices are best. The stakes in these potential crises are simply too high for such options to be dismissed with cavalier analyses carping on about a few frustrating experiences.

Michael S. Lund, **Underrating Preventive Diplomacy**, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1995 issue. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51214/michael-s-lund/underrating-preventive-diplomacy>. Retrieved on 27.03.2014

COMPOSITION

The most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and calm that is not easily disturbed. It is just these intense conflicts and their conflagration which are needed to produce valuable and lasting results.

Carl Gustav Jung. The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche.
The Collected Works. V. 8. Routledge: London, 1960. p. 26.

(Length: 400 to 450 words)

[value: 50 marks]

In light of the quote above, comment on the possible positive effects, if any, of different conflicts throughout the twentieth century.

PROVA ESCRITA DE LÍNGUA INGLESA

- Nesta prova, faça o que se pede, utilizando, caso deseje, o espaço indicado para rascunho. Em seguida, escreva os textos definitivos no **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, nos locais apropriados, pois não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos. Respeite o limite máximo de linhas disponibilizado para cada parte da prova. Qualquer fragmento de texto além desse limite será desconsiderado. No **Caderno de Textos Definitivos da Prova Escrita de Língua Inglesa**, utilize apenas caneta esferográfica de tinta preta, fabricada em material transparente.
- Será apenado, em cada parte da prova, o texto que não atender ao número mínimo de palavras estabelecido, de acordo com as regras editalícias.

TRANSLATION PART A

Iquitos, once a boom town, lies more than 2,000 miles from the mouth of the Amazon, yet here the river is still more than half a mile wide. You are deep in the steaming jungle. On both banks, rainforest comes tipping down to the water in a rough and tumble of vegetation sporting a million shades of green. Piranhas teem in the shallows while alligators idle on the banks. Birds of iridescent colours cackle and croak, whistle and squawk. Three-toed sloths lounge leisurely in the branches and monkeys career headlong through the treetops.

Into the midst of all this unbridled wildness there looms a floating incongruity in the discordant guise of a new three-storey luxury cruise boat. Aria, a 150-foot long glasshouse, is plying the waters around Iquitos at a point on the Amazon where Brazilian and Peruvian naval bases flaunt the armed flotillas farthest inland anywhere in the world. Luxury here spells everything the jungle is not: air conditioned, bug-, mud- and snake-free, comfortable and clean.

Internet: <www.spectator.co.uk/supplements/the-spectator-guide-to-cruises/7238013/its-a-jungle-out-there/> Retrieved on 13/9/2013.

Translate into Portuguese the previous excerpt adapted from Peter Hughes' article "It's a jungle out there", published in The Spectator on 17th September 2011.

[value: 20 marks]

TRANSLATION PART B

Os países da América se unem hoje com um sentimento comum de satisfação para comemorar o primeiro aniversário da Declaração de Paz do Itamaraty, de 17 de fevereiro de 1995, que restabeleceu a confiança e a amizade entre dois povos irmãos.

Esse é o caminho: o diálogo, nunca a confrontação; a razão, jamais a força. Serão, por certo, desafiadoras essas negociações. A agenda é densa e os temas se entrelaçam numa teia de condicionantes múltiplos. Acima de tudo, será preciso saber projetar uma visão de futuro, inspirada no interesse de longo prazo dos dois países. Uma visão que enfrente o desafio de buscar formas, mais do que de convivência pacífica, de desenvolvimento solidário. Esse processo, de dimensão histórica, deverá proporcionar que as Partes se sintam estimuladas a assumir, de forma gradual e progressiva, as tarefas e responsabilidades de, conjuntamente, assegurarem não tão somente a paz na região como também o desenvolvimento e o progresso social.

Source: **Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil**, número 78, 1º semestre de 1996, pp 37-38

Translate into English the excerpt above adapted from a speech delivered by the Brazilian Minister of State for External Relations, Ambassador Luís Felipe Lampreia, in Brasília on February 16th, 1996.

[value: 15 marks]

SUMMARY

A 700-kilometre march by indigenous protesters in Ecuador lasted two weeks before reaching the capital Quito on 22 March 2012. It echoes previous marches in both Peru and Bolivia against policies that pose a threat to indigenous communities.

The governments of all three Andean countries face criticism for policies designed to boost investment but that fail adequately to address the concerns of local people, who claim these projects threaten their physical and social environment.

Earlier in 2012, protesters from the northern Cajamarca region in Peru marched on Lima, repudiating plans to build a giant new copper and gold-mining plant at Conga, a project they say will affect water supplies to local communities.

These events are set against a background where, in all three countries, governments elected with the support of indigenous populations have taken steps to enshrine indigenous rights in their respective legal codes.

In Peru, these rights have recently been passed into law. Soon after his inauguration as president in July 2011, Ollanta Humala passed a law making prior consultation a legal obligation. Elected on a leftwing ticket that supported indigenous rights, Humala was obliged to enact a law vetoed by his predecessor, Alan García Pérez. In 2009, García had faced down protests in the northern town of Bagua as indigenous groups protested against plans to facilitate hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation in the Amazon jungle. Some thirty people, including police, were killed in the fray.

The governments of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador reflect aspects of what has been called the "pink wave" in Latin America, a reversion of the free-wheeling neo-liberal policies in vogue up until the early years of the new millennium — albeit to varying degrees. Bolivia and Ecuador belong to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alba), spearheaded by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Both countries have pursued policies highly critical of the United States and its policies towards Latin America. For his part, Peru's Humala came to power having previously established and led a highly nationalistic party which, in the elections of 2011, made common cause with the parties of the Peruvian left. Since taking office, however, Humala has abandoned much of his earlier leftist rhetoric.

In Peru traditional party elites had failed conspicuously to resolve the country's chronic economic and political problems, and were largely swept aside under the governments of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). But Fujimori's departure from the scene did not lead to the resurgence of partisan organisation. Even the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Apra), which dates from the 1930s and was once Peru's largest mass party, remained but a shadow of its former self; in the 2011 elections it won only four seats in the 130-seat unicameral legislature.

All three presidents have had scope, therefore, to refashion their country's electoral politics since taking power. In Bolivia, despite some defections, the MAS has a clear majority in both houses of the legislature, now known as the "plurinational legislative assembly". With only a modest presence, the opposition parties are effectively powerless to stop legislation.

Rafael Correa's party, Alianza País (AP), has likewise enjoyed a working majority in Ecuador's national assembly, although it has suffered some damaging defections in recent times. The situation is different in Peru, where Humala's Gana Peru grouping did not win a majority in the 2011 elections, but has since entered into alliances with centrist and centre-right groupings which have (at least so far) afforded him parliamentary majorities.

All three presidents have managed to fashion good working relationships with their armed forces, still an important factor of power in this part of Latin America. In each case, they have used their electoral prowess to push through changes at senior levels to garner support in the barracks.

Opinion-polls suggest support for Humala has risen strongly since his election in 2011; admiration for his young and attractive wife, Nadine, who has displayed some consummate political skills since becoming the first lady, makes her a political factor. It is too soon to say what will happen when the president's term ends in 2016. Humala has said he will not stand, and he lacks the parliamentary strength to change the constitution to be able to do so; but there are many who argue that he will seek to perpetuate his power by supporting the candidacy of his wife. This would be to emulate the Argentine model, whereby Néstor Kirchner was replaced as president by his wife, Cristina.

The future of mining and extractive industries more generally in Peru has become a major source of political discord, of which the Congas dispute is but the latest of a series of bitter confrontations. The Congas project involves the expansion of activities by Yanacocha, Latin America's largest gold producer. It is formed by a consortium of Newmont Mining (of the United States), Buenaventura (a large Peruvian miner) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), part of the World Bank. There has been a history of conflict between Yanacocha and local community groups and farmers stretching back over most of the past decade. The latter claim their livelihoods will be irretrievably damaged by the project.

Environmental impacts have been a major source of conflict between mining companies and communities throughout the Peruvian highlands. Several important projects have been halted owing to local pressure, including Yanacocha's Cerro Quilish scheme near Cajamarca city. Peru has seen an unprecedented expansion in mining and hydrocarbons projects in recent years, attracting more investment than most other Andean countries. Often these investments take place in remote areas where the state is virtually absent and where no other legitimate entities are on hand to mediate disputes.

The president previously sided with local communities against extractive industries. But Humala has found himself under huge pressure from pro-mining lobby groups and other interested parties to shift his ground. Since his election victory, he has publically acknowledged the need to continue to support mining investments but argued that the resources generated thereby should be used to improve the living conditions of the poorest, including those living in the areas surrounding mining camps. In December 2011, he dismissed many of the more leftwing voices in his cabinet.

However, traditionally, the Peruvian state has proved unable to respond effectively to such social needs, lacking the administrative machinery to achieve its ends. While social spending has increased in recent years, the conditions of poverty in Peru's interior have not improved substantially. Considerable doubt thus remains as to whether Humala will succeed where his predecessors failed.

John Crabtree. **The new Andean politics: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador**. openDemocracy, 25 March 2012. Internet: <www.opendemocracy.net/john-crabtree/new-andean-politics-bolivia-peru-ecuador>. Retrieved on 18/9/2013. John Crabtree is a research associate at the Latin American Centre, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University.

Write a summary, in your own words, in no more than 200 words, of the previous excerpt adapted from John Crabtree's 2012 openDemocracy paper **The new Andean politics: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador**.

[value: 15 marks]

COMPOSITION

Peru's government, like those in other emerging economies, sees development of minerals and timber as the fastest way to lift the country out of poverty, particularly in the country's largely untouched Amazon region. In Peru, land ownership is private, but the government has full rights to the resources below ground — such as minerals, oil, and gas — and above it — such as water, fish, and timber. In 2007, President Garcia infamously dismissed what he called "the law of the dog in the manger, which says, 'If I do not do it, then let no one do it.'" Without the state to give out concessions, Garcia wrote, the land would remain undeveloped, with "unused resources that cannot be traded, that do not receive investment, and do not create jobs."

But indigenous groups and communities in the Amazon fear the government is engaged in a large-scale giveaway of their land to industry at the expense of their cultural heritage. "For the indigenous people, the land is sacred, but in [Western culture] the land is simply a resource," said Roger Rumrill, an expert on the Amazon's indigenous communities. The government recently created new concessions that would open up 70 percent of the Amazon to oil and gas exploration, though many of these concessions haven't been given out yet.

Toni Johnson. **Peru's mineral wealth and woes**, Council on Foreign Relations, 10th February 2010.
Internet: <www.cfr.org/peru/perus-mineral-wealth-woes/p21408#p4>. Retrieved on 19/9/2013.

Weigh up the potential benefits and drawbacks of Peru opening up and developing its Amazon region.

(Length: 400-450 words)

[value: 50 marks]

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

- Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas para rascunho constantes deste caderno. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do **CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS DA PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. No resumo, assim como na redação a respeito de tema de ordem geral, respeite os limites mínimo e máximo de palavras estabelecidos.
- No **caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

TRANSLATION

(Total: 35 marks)

PART A (20 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Isabel Hilton's review of **The Opium Wars** by Julia Lovell, published in **The Guardian** on 11th September 2011.

The Opium Wars were an inglorious episode on both sides. They were triggered by an upstart imperial power being snubbed and rebuffed in its quest for trade: there was nothing, the Chinese loftily told the British emissaries, which China needed or wanted from the West — not their goods, not their ideas, and definitely not their company.

In March 1839, Canton commissioner Lin Zexu, hot from arresting 1,600 opium smokers and confiscating a full 14 tonnes of the narcotic, ordered foreign merchants to hand over their stocks and undertake to bring no more. The British agreed to relinquish over 20,000 chests of premium Bengal-grown opium, assuring merchants all the while that the crown would make good their losses, thus transforming the dispute into an affair of state. Lin reported to Emperor Daoguang that matters had been satisfactorily concluded. Months later, somewhat to his amazement, the British gunboats arrived.

A motley cast of characters played their part in the ensuing tragicomedy: bungling officials, rogue merchants, unscrupulous politicians, muscular military imperialists and the dithering, bewildered emperor.

Internet: <www.guardian.co.uk> (adapted).

PART B (15 marks)

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Maurício Carvalho Lyrio's study "A ascensão da China como potência".

Historiadores e sinólogos convergem na avaliação de que a civilização chinesa impressiona não apenas por sua longevidade, mas também e principalmente por sua grandeza econômica e política ao longo de boa parte da história, quando comparada a outras civilizações antigas e modernas.

Francis Bacon observou que o mundo seiscentista se recriava pela pólvora, pela prensa e pelo ímã. Omitiu o fato, no entanto, de que todos os três foram descobertos séculos antes na China.

Malgrado seu *status* de economia mais pujante do mundo ao longo de três milênios, em 1829, já se vislumbravam os primeiros indícios da queda abrupta que apeguenaria a economia chinesa diante das rivais europeias no século seguinte. Passadas sucessivas décadas de declínio relativo, a produção industrial chinesa era, nos anos 1930, menor do que a da Bélgica. Já sua produção de aparelhos e equipamentos não ultrapassava a de um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano.

M. C. Lyrio. *A ascensão da China como potência: fundamentos políticos internos*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010, p. 16-8.

SUMMARY

(Total: 15 marks)

Write a summary, in your own words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael Glosny's 2010 *Polity* paper "China and the BRICs". (Length: no more than 200 words)

Despite fundamental differences between the four countries and structural constraints of unipolarity that might have kept them from cooperating, the BRICs have surpassed most expectations in recent years in forming a nascent political grouping. On the foundation of other meetings between newly emerging powers, most importantly the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) arrangement, the BRIC foreign ministers began meeting in 2006. BRIC cooperation expanded to include two finance ministers' summits, meetings of leaders, and a stand-alone BRIC leaders' summit in June 2009, which produced a joint communiqué. Russia and Brazil have been the driving forces responsible for transforming the BRICs from an abstract financial concept into a genuine political grouping. However, the Chinese have also agreed to participate and cooperate. In a lengthy interview on the BRICs on the eve of the summit, Director-General Wu Hailong of the International Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the BRIC grouping as an "evolution from a hypothetical into a realistic platform for international cooperation."

As the world's second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and a rising power whose influence is spreading across the globe, China has already been acknowledged as a superpower by the rest of the world. Having China as a partner has helped raise the profile of the other three BRICs partners, but China itself is less reliant on this association. However logical this cooperation may be, it is also costly and risky. As Chinese leaders' time is limited and valuable, participation in meetings has an opportunity cost. Moreover, China also risks being perceived as participating in a political bloc designed to challenge and undermine the U.S. and the western liberal order.

For China, cooperation with the BRICs has occurred under the structural constraints of unipolarity, which provide it with an incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and ensure its behavior is not seen as a threat to which the hyper-sensitive hegemon might feel prompted to respond. However, China has benefited from its cooperation with the BRICs in significant ways. Looking forward, one of the major challenges for China in its engagement with the BRICs is how to maximize its benefits from cooperation while doing its utmost to make sure the U.S. does not perceive its cooperation with the BRICs as a threat. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, perfectly captures this dilemma in his analysis of BRIC cooperation. He argues that "[China's] objective is through cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system, but concomitantly to endeavor not to challenge the U.S. in a confrontational mode." China does not see its cooperation with the BRICs as part of an anti-U.S. hard balancing coalition. Were anyone to attempt to move the BRICs in that direction, China would oppose the move, as would other member states. Despite the significance of BRIC cooperation, fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued relevance of the U.S., and intra-BRIC competition and rivalry seriously limit the extent to which further BRIC cooperation can go. Looking to the future, as the U.S. declines and the BRICs continue to rise, it is very possible that intra-BRIC competition and rivalry will become fierce, further curbing cooperation among the member states.

U.S. policy is an important factor that could potentially overcome such limitations and push the BRICs toward more far-reaching cooperation. If the U.S. views limited BRIC cooperation as an anti-U.S. bloc and so adopts a more hostile policy towards this “alliance,” it may drive these countries closer together and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, were the U.S. and other western countries to spurn BRIC demands for limited changes in the international order, the BRICs might well become disillusioned, see themselves as forced to mount a sweeping challenge, and seek to replace it with an order more suited to their interests. Thus far, this scenario seems unlikely. Western countries have started to show themselves to be more receptive to the idea of reforming the order and accommodating some of the BRIC demands. Although negotiation on reforming the international order is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process, the willingness of western countries to entertain BRIC proposals should enhance the BRICs’ satisfaction with the international order, and so make them more likely to act as “responsible stakeholders.” That would put paid to the prospect of them challenging the status quo.

Looking ahead, China’s power will likely provide a challenge to BRIC cooperation and the BRICs as a grouping. Although the other three powers have garnered prestige by their association with the rising Chinese juggernaut, analysts have begun to suggest that China’s overwhelming power relative to the other three will eventually undermine the BRICs as a coherent grouping. For instance, recent unofficial calls for a Sino-American G2 designed to address global challenges and manage the global order suggest China is no longer an emerging power or a developing country. However much this may raise concern for BRIC coherence, China is already much more powerful than the other BRICs by most measures. Moreover, its advantages have not hobbled the positive momentum of BRIC cooperation. Besides, although foreign analysts may call for a G2, Premier Wen Jiabao and most Chinese experts have criticized the concept as inappropriate and unworkable, arguing that China is too weak to shoulder such responsibility whilst recognizing that endorsing the idea would harm China’s diplomacy, isolating it from the developing world. In fact, rather than being eager to be seen as part of a G2 leading and managing the world, China’s leaders are more than glad to continue to keep a relatively low profile as a developing country, to cooperate with other emerging powers, and to benefit from this cooperation, all the while studiously avoiding being seen as standing up to the United States.

Michael A. Glosny. *China and the BRICs: a real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world.* In: *Polity*, v. 42, n.º 1, January 2010, 100-29. Internet: <www.palgrave-journals.com> (adapted).

COMPOSITION**(Total: 50 marks)**

In the joint declaration at the conclusion of the 4th BRICS Summit, the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa vowed to enhance mutual cooperation and contribute to world development and prosperity. The summit has come at a crucial moment, as the global economic recovery is still dragging its feet, entangled by fragile financial systems, high public and private debt, high unemployment and the rising price of oil. Pressing issues, such as climate change, food security and energy security also pose grave challenges. "BRICS cooperation now stands at a new starting point," declared President Hu Jintao, adding that the five emerging economies need to build on current cooperation and blaze new trails so as to inject vitality into their mechanism and so usher in a more just, fair and reasonable international political and economic order.

China Daily, 30th March 2012. Internet: <www.chinadaily.com> (adapted).

Taking due account of the text above and of China's strategic objectives, comment on how its participation in the BRICS might fit into this framework.

(Length: 400-450 words)

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

- Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas para rascunho constantes deste caderno. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do **CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS DA PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. Em cada parte, respeite o limite máximo de linhas estabelecido.
- No **caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

TRANSLATION

(Total: 35 marks)

PART A (20 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following passage adapted from John Tomlinson's **Globalization and Cultural Identity**:

Once upon a time, local, autonomous, distinct and well-defined, robust and culturally sustaining connections existed between geographical place and cultural experience. They constituted one's "cultural identity", something people simply "had" as an inheritance, a benefit of continuity with the past. Identity, then, was not just a description of cultural belonging; it was a collective treasure of local communities. But it proved to be fragile, needing protection and preservation. Into this world of manifold, discrete cultural identities suddenly burst the corrosive power of globalization. Globalization, so the story goes, has swept like a flood tide through the world's diverse cultures, bringing a market-driven homogenization of cultural experience, thus obliterating the differences between locality-defined cultures. Whilst communities in the mainstream of the flow of capitalism have seen a sort of standardized version of their cultures exported worldwide, it is the "weaker" cultures of the developing world that have been most threatened.

John Tomlinson. **Globalization and cultural identity**. Internet: <www.polity.co.uk>.

PART B (15 marks)

Translate the following excerpt from Mauro José Teixeira Destri's **Globalização, Educação e Diversidade Cultural** into English:

Os problemas da globalização e as consequências e desafios que ela apresenta a respeito de assuntos como a biodiversidade, a diversidade cultural e a educação estão fundamentados na perspectiva histórica da ocidentalização do mundo, iniciada pela dominação colonial europeia desde o século XV e ratificada pelo poderio norte-americano em todas as esferas, com seu poder de "disseminar cultura". Tal dominação do etnocentrismo ocidental, amparada por uma ideologia neoliberal, abrange não só o domínio econômico-financeiro, mas também o controle da informação e das comunicações referentes às grandes empresas multinacionais, impondo, dessa forma, uma "padronização" cultural. A globalização tem sua limitação mais grave por não ter um modelo de sociedade viável. A educação, concebida como a transmissão de visões do mundo, de saberes e de sistemas de valores, tem um enorme desafio histórico na defesa e na preservação da diversidade cultural, o que tem sido abordado em diversas esferas pelos diversos países ao redor do mundo.

Mauro José Teixeira Destri. **Globalização, educação e diversidade cultural**. Internet: <www.fisma.edu.br>.

Write in your own words a summary of the following article from **The Economist** in **no more than 200 words**.

Geoffrey Crowther, editor of **The Economist** from 1938 to 1956, used to advise young journalists to “simplify, then exaggerate”. He might have changed his advice if he had lived to witness the current debate on globalisation. There is a lively discussion about whether it is good or bad. But everybody seems to agree that globalisation is a *fait accompli*: that the world is flat, if you are a (Tom) Friedmanite, or that the world is run by a handful of global corporations, if you are a (Naomi) Kleinian.

Pankaj Ghemawat of IESE Business School in Spain is one of the few who has kept his head on the subject. For more than a decade he has subjected the simplifiers and exaggerators to a barrage of statistics. He has now set out his case — that we live in an era of semi-globalisation at most — in a single volume, **World 3.0**, that should be read by anyone who wants to understand the most important economic development of our time.

Mr Ghemawat points out that many indicators of global integration are surprisingly low. Only 2% of students are at universities outside their home countries; and only 3% of people live outside their country of birth. Only 7% of rice is traded across borders. Only 7% of directors of S&P 500 companies are foreigners — and, according to a study a few years ago, less than 1% of all American companies have any foreign operations. Exports are equivalent to only 20% of global GDP. Some of the most vital arteries of globalisation are badly clogged: air travel is restricted by bilateral treaties and ocean shipping is dominated by cartels.

Far from “ripping through people’s lives”, as Arundhati Roy, an Indian writer, claims, globalisation is shaped by familiar things, such as distance and cultural ties. Mr Ghemawat argues that two otherwise identical countries will engage in 42% more trade if they share a common language than if they do not, 47% more if both belong to a trading block, 114% more if they have a common currency and 188% more if they have a common colonial past.

What about the “new economy” of free-flowing capital and borderless information? Here Mr Ghemawat’s figures are even more striking. Foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for only 9% of all fixed investment. Less than 20% of venture capital is deployed outside the fund’s home country. Only 20% of shares traded on stockmarkets are owned by foreign investors. Less than 20% of Internet traffic crosses national borders.

And what about the direction rather than the extent of globalisation? Surely Mr Friedman (author of **The World is Flat**) and company are right about where we are headed even if they exaggerate how far we have got? In fact, today’s levels of emigration pale beside those of a century ago, when 14% of Irish-born people and 10% of native Norwegians had emigrated. Back then you did not need visas. Today the world spends \$88 billion a year on processing travel documents and in a tenth of the world’s countries a passport costs more than a tenth of the average annual income.

That FDI fell from nearly \$2 trillion in 2007 to \$1 trillion in 2009 can be put down to the global financial crisis. But other trends suggest that globalisation is reversible. Nearly a quarter of North American and European companies shortened their supply chains in 2008 (the effect of Japan’s disaster on its partsmakers will surely prompt further shortening). It takes three times as long to process a lorry-load of goods crossing the Canadian-American border as it did before September 11th 2001. Even the Internet is succumbing to this pattern of regionalisation, as governments impose a patchwork of local restrictions on content.

Mr Ghemawat also explodes the myth that the world is being taken over by a handful of giant companies. The level of concentration in many vital industries has fallen dramatically since 1950 and remained roughly constant since 1980: 60 years ago two car companies accounted for half of the world’s car production, compared with six companies today.

He also refutes the idea that globalisation means homogenisation. The increasing uniformity of cities’ skylines worldwide masks growing choice within them, to which even the most global of companies must adjust. McDonald’s serves vegetarian burgers in India and spicy ones in Mexico, where Coca-Cola uses cane sugar rather than the corn syrup it uses in America. MTV, which went global on the assumption that “A-lop-bop-a-doo-bop-a-lop-bam-boom” meant the same in every language, now includes five calls to prayer a day in its Indonesian schedules.

Mr Ghemawat notes that company bosses lead the pack when it comes to overestimating the extent of globalisation. Nokia, for example, spent years trying to break into Japan’s big but idiosyncratic mobile-handset market with its rest-of-the-world-beating products before finally conceding defeat. In general companies frequently have more to gain through exploiting national differences — perhaps through arbitrage — than by muscling them aside.

This sober view of globalisation deserves a wide audience. But whether it will get it is another matter. This is partly because **World 3.0** is a much less exciting title than **The World is Flat** or “Jihad vs. McWorld”. And it is partly because people seem to have a natural tendency to overestimate the distance-destroying quality of technology. Go back to the era of dictators and world wars and you can find exactly the same addiction to globaloney. Henry Ford said cars and planes were “binding the world together”. Martin Heidegger said that “everything is equally far and equally near”. George Orwell got so annoyed by all this that he wrote a blistering attack on all the fashionable talk about the abolition of distance and the disappearance of frontiers — and that was in 1944, when Adolf Hitler was advancing his own unique approach to the flattening of the world.

I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.

Mahatma Gandhi

In light of the above quotation and of the other texts comprising the test, would you say that globalization is a threat to local culture or a source of its enrichment?

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

- Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas para rascunho constantes deste caderno. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do **CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS DA PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. Em cada questão, respeite o limite máximo de linhas estabelecido.
- No **caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

QUESTÃO 1

Translation (total: 35 marks)

PART A (20 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Eleanor Roosevelt's speech which opened a series of United Nations seminars at Brandeis University on December 17th, 1954:

You hear people say, "Why hasn't the United Nations done this or that?" The United Nations functions just as well as the member nations make it function, no better or worse. So the first thing to look at is the kind of machinery that was set up, and what it was meant to do.

Now we have to cast our minds back to the time when the Charter was first planned. The war was not over, and this was a dream — an idea to set up an organization, the object of which was to keep peace.

Great tracts of the world had first-hand knowledge of war on their doorsteps. We did not know what it was like, either to be occupied or to be bombed. We need to use our imaginations, because we really must grasp what the nations felt then and still feel.

What happened, of course, was that peace has never been found, so this organization has had to face questions that were not on its mind at the outset. But talk itself can have great value. You have to envisage it as a bridge, to think of the General Assembly as a place where bridges are built between peoples.

PART B (15 marks)

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from a lecture delivered by Ambassador Celso Amorim as guest speaker at the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Seminar on 5th January, 2009:

A reforma das Nações Unidas é peça-chave da agenda de mudanças. O multilateralismo é a expressão normativa da multipolaridade. O mundo multipolar que emerge neste século deve encontrar seu paralelismo lógico no reforço das instituições multilaterais.

A reforma da ONU, em particular de seu Conselho de Segurança, decorre da necessidade de aumentar a legitimidade, transparência e representatividade nas suas decisões. Mesmo sem resolver todos os problemas (como o do veto, por exemplo), um Conselho ampliado enviaria aos Estados-membros uma mensagem de confiança na capacidade da ONU de se adaptar aos novos tempos.

O Brasil fez uma clara opção pelo multilateralismo. A contribuição brasileira à Minustah no Haiti constitui uma demonstração concreta desse compromisso. Reflete a nossa "não-indiferença" diante de uma situação difícil vivida por uma nação com a qual temos muitas afinidades. Coaduna-se, ademais, com os princípios de ação coletiva para prevenir ameaças à paz e à segurança internacionais.

SUMMARY (Total: 15 marks)

Write a summary in your own words **not over 200 words in length** of the following excerpt adapted from Gwynne Dyer's *Future Tense: the coming world order?* (Toronto: Random House, 2004).

The United Nations as constituted in 1945 was a profoundly cynical organization; more explicitly so even than the League of Nations. It accepted without demur that its member states enjoyed absolute sovereignty and would never be forced to submit to intervention in their internal affairs (with the sole and uncertain exception that acts of genocide might trigger international intervention). The UN Charter made no moral or practical distinction between the most law-abiding democracies and the most repressive dictatorships. How could it, when more than half its members were dictatorships themselves? The UN was not about love, or justice, or freedom, although words of that sort are sprinkled freely through the preamble to the UN Charter; it was about avoiding another world war.

The problem that the surviving governments faced in 1945 was this: the existing international system is bankrupt in an era of weapons of mass destruction. The world cannot afford to allow countries armed with nuclear weapons to go to war with each other. It can certainly never again go through one of those generalized great-power melees that in the past were the main way of adjusting the international system to accommodate the changing balance between the great powers. If we fight that kind of war just once more, the whole northern hemisphere will fry. We therefore have to change the system. In fact, we have to outlaw war.

Because 'outlaw war' sounds like a naive slogan on a protester's banner, people fail to grasp how radical a change it was for the great powers of the world to sign up to such a rule in 1945. Since the first city-states of Mesopotamia five thousand years ago, war had been a legitimate tool of statecraft, with no long-lasting opprobrium attached to waging 'aggressive war' so long as you were successful. Empires rose and fell, the militarily competent prospered. Now, all of a sudden, it's over.

Since 1945, according to the UN Charter, it has been illegal to wage war against another country except in two tightly defined circumstances. One is that you have just been attacked, and are fighting back pending the arrival of international help. The other exception arises when the Security Council authorizes various member states to use military force on its behalf to roll back an aggression, or to enforce its decisions on a strictly limited number of other questions.

And that's it. Apart from these exceptions, international war — that is, war waged by a sovereign government across an international border — is illegal. It is illegal to attack a country because it is sitting on territory that previously belonged to your country. It is even illegal to attack a country because it is ruled by a wicked dictator who oppresses his own people. The rules had to be written like that because to allow exceptions on these counts would have left loopholes big enough to drive a tank through.

Making war illegal does not mean that all wars have stopped, any more than making murder illegal has stopped all killings, but it has transformed the context in which wars take place. The United Nations does not always act to roll back a successful aggression, because that requires getting past the vetoes wielded by all five permanent members of the Security Council and then finding member states willing to put their troops at risk on the ground, but it almost never recognizes border changes accomplished by war.

There is also, however, much that the United Nations cannot do. First and foremost, it cannot act against a perceived interest of any of the great powers, for in order to get them all to sign up it had to offer them a special deal: vetoes that allow the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China to block any UN action they don't like. It's neither fair nor pretty, but how else were the founders of the UN going to get the great powers to sign up — and what use would the

organization be if some of them were outside it? Likewise, the United Nations cannot intervene in a sovereign state — or at least it could not until recently — even to stop the most horrendous violations of human rights.

Despite such limitations, the UN is a central and indispensable part of the modern world. It is the institution through which a politically conscious global society first came into existence, and its specialized organs are still the arena in which most of the world's large-scale deals are made on matters ranging from telecommunications frequencies and trade to public health and the environment. It is the organizer and command centre for many of the peacekeeping missions that hold old enemies apart and try to minimize the level of violence in failed states, and the source of legal authority for many peacekeeping missions it does not directly control. Most important by far, it is the repository of the new international law which bans the use of aggressive military force, even by the great powers.

It is not generally realised how important this law is because it has so often been broken, especially by the really big powers. Nonetheless, most of the wars that have not involved veto-wielding superpowers have tended not to last very long before international diplomatic intervention puts a halt to them. The Security Council busies itself with appeals for a cease-fire and offers of peace-keeping troops. This has made it hard for those involved to go on fighting. So wars have rarely ended in decisive victories, and territory has almost never changed hands in a legal and permanent way. These very significant constraints may also explain why nuclear weapons have not been used in war for the past 59 years.

Of course, these same constraints can feel very burdensome if you happen to be the greatest power in the world, with overwhelming superiority in both nuclear and conventional weapons. You might even wind up filled with frustration and fury because all these Lilliput nations are trying to use the rules of the United Nations to tie you down like Gulliver.

The best measure of any institution's real importance is how much its enemies hate it. US neo-cons, for instance, hate the UN a lot. They portray it one moment as an irrelevant excrescence and the next as an arrogant, uncaring organization of great power. The United Nations, though, was not created to fight evil wherever it appears. It was designed primarily to stop the kind of straightforward cross-border aggression that had triggered both the First and the Second World Wars, but must not be allowed to cause a Third. So, since the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council stand to lose everything themselves in another world war, they have generally been able to act in a surprisingly coordinated and decisive manner at the UN when events elsewhere threatened to drag them into such a conflict.

Available at: www.gwynnedyer.com.
Retrieved on 24/3/2010.

COMPOSITION (Total: 50 marks)

It will be no surprise to those who follow UN affairs that the end of the Cold War has been the single most formative experience in the existence of the Security Council. There are many ways to demonstrate this. The simplest is to count the absolute number of Council resolutions. For the period 1946-1989 the annual average number of resolutions passed was fifteen; since then the average has been more than sixty. The Council has moved from roughly one decision a month to one per week. This is indeed a dramatic change.

Peter Wallensteen e Patrick Johansson's. **Security Council decisions in perspective**.
In: Malone, D.M. ed. *The United Nations Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century*. London: International Peace Academy, 2004 (Adapted).

In what other ways have the Security Council's actions changed since the end of the Cold War? Why?

(Length: 350-450 words)

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

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QUESTÃO 1

TRANSLATION (Total: 35 marks)

PART A (20 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Edward Said's 1993 Reith Lecture "Intellectual exile: expatriates and marginals. What is the proper role of the intellectual in today's society?"

Exile means being neither entirely at one with the new setting, nor fully disencumbered of the old; beset with half-involvements and half-detachments; nostalgic and sentimental yet equally a consummate mimic or secret outcast. Being adept at survival becomes the imperative, with the dangers of getting too comfortable and secure constituting a threat constantly to be guarded against.

Salim, the main character of V.S. Naipaul's novel "A Bend in the River," is an affecting instance of the modern intellectual in exile: an East African Muslim of Indian origin, he has left the coast and journeyed into the interior, where he survives precariously in a new state modelled on Mobutu's Zaire. Naipaul portrays Salim's life at a 'bend in the river' as a no-man's-land, to which hail the European intellectual advisers (who succeed the idealistic missionaries of colonial times), as well as the assorted mercenaries, profiteers, and other Third World drifters in whose ambience Salim is forced to live, gradually forfeiting his property and integrity in the mounting confusion.

As the novel unravels, the natives themselves have become exiles in their own country, so preposterous and erratic are the whims of the ruler, Big Man, a symbol of all post-colonial regimes.

PART B (15 marks)

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from a special *Folha de São Paulo* report on Sri Lanka by Roberto Candelori published 18th May 2009:

O Sri Lanka vê-se diante de um conflito que já dura um quarto de século. Com uma população dividida entre cingaleses budistas (74%) e tâmeis de orientação hindu (18%), o antigo Ceilão tornou-se um "banho de sangue", segundo a ONU.

O país conquistou a independência dos britânicos em 1948, quando começou a implantação de políticas discriminatórias contra a minoria tâmil, que tivera lugar de destaque na administração colonial. Sucessivos governos baixaram leis que cercearam os direitos dos tâmeis ao impor-lhes o cingalês como língua oficial e restringir-lhes o acesso à educação superior e a cargos públicos.


Revoltados, os tâmeis passaram a reagir, exigindo a igualdade linguística, social e religiosa.

Em 25 anos de conflito, estima-se que tenham ocorrido até 100 mil mortes, e o futuro parece não menos assustador. Mais de 250 mil tâmeis encontram-se agora sob a mira dos fuzis e sob o silêncio da comunidade internacional. A ordem é atirar.

SUMMARY (Total: 15 marks)

Write a summary in your own words **not over 200 words** in length of the following excerpt adapted from “Open up,” an *Economist* special report on migration published 3rd January 2008.

Enoch Powell had a point. The radical British Conservative politician warned, nearly four decades ago, that immigrants were causing such strife that “like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood.” That proved to be nonsense, as did his advice that migrants should be encouraged to leave. Had they done so, Britain and other rich countries that depend heavily on foreign labour would be in a dreadful state. One prediction he made was spot on, however: that by about now, one in ten people in Britain would be migrants. At the last count in 2005, the foreign-born made up 9.7% of the British population.



By historical standards, that is high but consistent with that in other rich economies. In America the proportion is now about 13%, not far off the 15% peak reached shortly before World War I. What is particularly striking in Europe is that countries which had hitherto known only emigration, e.g. Ireland or Greece, now have an influx typical of countries like Australia and the U.S.

This special report argues that both emigration and immigration countries, as well as the migrants themselves, have been coping remarkably well with this new force reshaping our world.

Yet ominous signs are emerging of a shrill backlash against immigration on both sides of the Atlantic.

Politicians may tinker with migration policies. They will certainly, under public pressure, pump extra resources and energy into building more fences and walls to keep foreigners out. By linking immigration to terrorism, they may even make their societies more fiercely policed. The basic forces driving migration, though, are unlikely to ebb.

Migrants move mainly for economic reasons. Most appear to do so legally. The number of illegal migrants is by definition hard to ascertain, but likely to be smaller than the legal sort. They probably comprise the bulk of those seen floating on rafts in the Mediterranean or scrabbling over the fence from Mexico to America. Others do not risk the high seas or physical borders, entering instead under some other guise, perhaps as tourists, and then staying on.

Lastly, there are refugees and asylum-seekers, strictly defined as those escaping persecution but often including anybody forced to flee, for example from a war. According to the UN's refugee agency, at the close of 2006 some 10m people fell under this category.

The number of migrants worldwide has been reckoned at 200m. That sounds a lot, but actually adds up to only 3% of the world's population, so there is ample potential for growth. Migration has proved a successful ploy for the world's poor to improve their lot. Nor is it the very poorest who travel, for money is required to travel overseas.

In the 100 years to 1920, brighter prospects encouraged some 60m Europeans to uproot and move to the New World. A European crossing the Atlantic could expect to double his income. Today the incentives are even more enticing. Those moving from a poor country to a rich one can expect to see their income rise fivefold. As long as such differentials persist, the draw will continue.

Demography too plays a big part. Not every migrant is bound for America or Europe: two in every five head for another poor or middle-income destination. Those aiming for the richest parts of the world, however, do their inhabitants a favour. Without them, the greying and increasingly choosy populations across the rich world would already be on the decline. That is paramount for their fast-changing economies, which consistently demand either highly skilled workers or those willing to do unpleasant and tiring jobs.



One reason why much of the world has enjoyed a sustained economic boom with low inflation in the past decade is that the effective global workforce is expanding apace. The IMF estimates it has quadrupled since 1980. In all likelihood it will continue to grow, though at a slower rate, with a 40% increase in the world's working-age population forecast by 2050. According to the UN, the global stock of migrants has more than doubled in four decades. Not enough young natives have the skills or motivation, so the rich must hope outsiders will keep coming.

And they will. Luckily for Europe and America, there are huge pools of workers eager to jump on the next plane, train or leaking raft to work abroad. This can prove beneficial for their countries of origin as well.

If exporting brawn generally makes sense for a poor country, letting its better brains drain away may not. Most poor and middle-income countries grapple with chronic shortages of skilled labour. Professionals in demand abroad are the hardest to keep at home. In fact, if the lure is strong enough, it is virtually impossible to block the exit of the highly skilled.

Rich countries are taking in more highly skilled migrants than ever before. Yet emigration of skilled workers may be a consequence rather than a cause of problems in the sending country. For example, nurses may be emigrating because their salaries are not being paid or because hospitals are crumbling; entrepreneurs may be relocating because the local business climate is wretched. Halting emigration - even if that were feasible - would not solve these problems. Nurses might still quit their jobs, would-be entrepreneurs might sit on their hands.

Indeed, some argue that emigration can actually enhance the stock of brainpower. Migrants spend longer studying, pick up more skills and experience, and may then return home. Remittances are often used to fund schooling. Moreover, the prospect of emigration and prosperity abroad may induce others to get an education. All this suggests that the consequences of emigration, albeit not negligible, are tricky to measure. Governments should thus endeavour to tackle the factors pushing their skilled professionals out. If émigrés can be enticed back home, even for short spells, so much the better.

Unfettered movement of capital and goods has made the world a far richer place while greater human mobility has not only created wealth but also helped share it out more evenly. The billions in remittances repatriated each year eloquently testify to that. The cost of keeping people out would be steep.

Nasty surprises are constantly sprung on us. Wars can suddenly displace millions, who may start out as refugees but frequently end up as migrants. Some claim that climate change may forcibly relocate tens of millions of people in the space of decades. Misguided policies, a backlash over terrorism or a failure to integrate migrants could all pose serious problems. Nonetheless, 40 years on, it seems clear that Mr Powell was utterly amiss in everything save his sums.

COMPOSITION (Total: 50 marks)

At the beginning of the 21st century, migration continues to loom large as a subject of media interest, of community preoccupation and of political controversy. Nevertheless, the discourse has evolved significantly in recent years, both in terms of substance and tone, and is now conducted with noticeably less acrimony than before and with much reduced levels of distrust between developed and developing countries. For instance, at [several recent high-level international conferences] participants were, in general, disposed to agree that migration holds considerable potential for economic and social development. At the same time, however, it was apparent that there is much more to be done before agreement can be reached on appropriate management strategies to be put in place, both nationally and on the international level, for that promise to be realized. The task of formulating a workable global approach to the management of international migration remains a formidable challenge, and one that will require both time and effort over the coming years.

An extract from the Introduction to **World Migration 2008: managing labour mobility in the evolving global economy**. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008, p. 1.

Taking into account the points made above, discuss the main issues involved in the contemporary political debate on migration.

(Length: 350-400 words)

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

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No **caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

QUESTÃO 1

TRANSLATION (Total: 50 marks)

PART A (25 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt from James Baldwin's "Notes of a native son" (1955) [in: **The United States in Literature**. Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1976, p. M 132.]:

I was born in Harlem thirty-one years ago. I began plotting novels at about the time I learned to read. The story of my childhood is the usual bleak fantasy, and we can dismiss it with the restrained observation that I certainly would not consider living it again. In those days my mother was given to the exasperating and mysterious habit of having babies. As they were born, I took them over with one hand and held a book with the other. The children probably suffered, though they have since been kind enough to deny it, and in this way I read **Uncle Tom's Cabin** and **A Tale of two Cities** over and over and over again; in this way, in fact, I read just about everything I could get my hands on — except the Bible, probably because it was the only book I was encouraged to read. I must also confess that I wrote — a great deal — and my first professional triumph occurred at the age of twelve or thereabouts.

PART B (25 marks)

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Mário Henrique Simonsen's **Brasil 2002** (5^a ed. Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1974, p. 11):

A idéia de prever a evolução econômica dos povos segundo modelos rígidos de determinismo histórico sempre seduziu os cientistas sociais. O futurólogo é uma espécie de cartomante recheado de álgebra, e que procura satisfazer uma das maiores angústias da humanidade, o pré-conhecimento do futuro. Além disso, o conteúdo de suas formulações parece, pelo menos para os leigos, bem mais fundamentado cientificamente do que a simples leitura de um baralho. Fora o aspecto psicológico, há a questão estética. Os modelos que prevêm o futuro da humanidade segundo uma trajetória imutável, inabalável por hipóteses acessórias, possuem uma grandiosidade apocalíptica, inacessível àquelas construções prosaicas repletas de condicionais e condicionantes. Não surpreende, por isso, que os economistas tantas vezes se tenham aventurado no desenvolvimento desses modelos que, com o mínimo de hipóteses, apresentam o máximo de previsões.

A aplicação do determinismo histórico às ciências sociais envolve dois problemas: um filosófico, que consiste em questionar a validade da tese; outro, bem mais prático, que é o de saber se temos o direito de afirmar que descobrimos as leis desse determinismo.

COMPOSITION (Total: 50 marks)

“Nationalism – Internationalism. These abstract words, so often abused, so often misunderstood, cover high ideals and strong emotions, reflect modes of thought and action that shape our world. We often see the word ‘nationalism’ used in a derogatory sense. The same is true of the word ‘internationalism’. When nationalism connotes, for example, a ‘go-it-alone’ isolationism, and internationalism an outlook that belittles the significance of national life and of nations as centres of political action and spiritual tradition, the words become contradictory and the attitudes they describe irreconcilable. From such interpretations of the words comes the tendency to think of nationalism as in fundamental conflict with an internationalist attitude.”

Discuss the above statement, adapted from an address by then United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at Stanford University in 1955, in the light of current international political events.

(Length: 350-450 words)

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
INSTITUTO RIO BRANCO

CONCURSO DE ADMISSÃO À CARREIRA DE DIPLOMATA

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

1 – TRANSLATION

(Total: 30 Marks)

A)

(15 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following text adapted from John Cornwell's *Seminary Boy* (New York: Doubleday, 2006):

By late 1944, and after four wartime home removals, I was attending a Catholic primary school run by Irish nuns and spinsters, surrounded by a hostile world of unbelief. One Sunday a V-2 rocket destroyed a nearby Anglican church, killing most of the congregation. The next day Miss Doonan, who taught us so piously to make the sign of the cross, informed us that these people had been struck down by God because they were Protestants.

The day before we celebrated the end of the war in Europe, I was humming to myself, skipping ahead of the girl who took me to school, when two bull terriers hurtled round the corner and sank their teeth into my plump legs. I spent the morning in a doctor's surgery being stitched up and painted with iodine. According to the policeman who visited our house on Victory Day, the dogs' owner claimed that I had made the animals bite me by my singing and dancing.

B)

(15 marks)

Translate into English the following text adapted from Wilson Martins' *A Palavra Escrita* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1996):

Não havia razão para que os gregos amassem e, por conseqüência, guardassem os seus próprios livros: Sócrates, como tantos outros, nada escreveu. Desprezando profundamente os "bárbaros", não havia igualmente razão para que amassem e, por conseqüência, procurassem guardar os livros estrangeiros. Assim, o povo letrado por excelência da Antiguidade, a pátria das letras e das artes, não possuía bibliotecas.

Para completar o paradoxo, é um povo militar e guerreiro, comerciante e prático, imediatista e político, que só admitia a palavra — escrita ou oral — como instrumento da ação, que vai, no mundo ocidental, possuir as melhores bibliotecas e, em particular, as primeiras bibliotecas públicas. Nisto, aliás, neste último traço, está gravado o caráter de um povo, voltado para a conquista do mundo e capaz de imediatamente perceber a utilidade de todas as armas: com os romanos, o livro passa da categoria sagrada para a categoria profana, deixa de ser intocável para ser condutor, e, posto ao alcance de todos, é o veículo por excelência das idéias, dos projetos e dos empreendimentos.

2 – SUMMARY & TEXTUAL EXERCISES

(Total: 25 marks)

A. Read the following text adapted from **Empires with Expiration Dates** by Niall Ferguson in FOREIGN POLICY, nr. 156 (Sept./Oct. 2006), and complete the exercises at the end. **(10 marks)**

B. Summarize the text, **in your own words**, in up to 200 words. **(15 marks)**

Empires, more than nation-states, are the principal actors on the stage of world history. Much of history consists of the deeds of the few score empires that once ruled alien peoples across large tracts of the globe. Yet the lifespan of empires has tended to decline. Compared with their predecessors, the empires of the last century were singularly short-lived. Reduced imperial life expectancy has profound implications for our own time.

Officially, there are no empires now, only 190-plus nation-states. Yet the ghosts of empires past continue to stalk the Earth. Regional conflicts are easily — nay, often glibly — explained in terms of imperial sins of yore: an arbitrary border here, a strategy of divide-and-rule there.

Moreover, many of today's most important states are still recognizably the progeny of empires. Imperial inheritance is apparent from the Russian Federation to Great Britain, Italy and Germany. India is the heir of the Mughal Empire and the British Raj, China the direct descendant of the Middle Kingdom. In the Americas, the imperial legacy is patent from Canada to Argentina.

Today's world, in short, is as much one of ex-empires and former colonies as it is of nation-states. Even institutions designed to reorder the world after 1945 have a distinctly imperial bent. For what _____ are the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council if not a cozy _____ of empires past? And what, pray, is "humanitarian intervention" if not a more politically correct-sounding version of the western empires' old "civilizing mission"?

Empires' life cycles and geographic reach are remarkably irregular. Whereas the average Roman empire lasted over 800 years, equivalents elsewhere before the modern age survived no more than half that time.

The empires forged in the 20th century, by contrast, were comparatively short. Why did they prove so ephemeral? The answer lies partly in the unprecedented degrees of centralized power, economic control, and social homogeneity to which the Communists in Russia and China, the Fascists in Germany and Italy and the expansionist Japanese aspired. They were not content with the haphazard administrative arrangements that had characterized the old empires. Though they inherited from the 19th-century nation-builders an insatiable appetite for uniformity, these new "empire states" repudiated religious and legal constraints on the use of force. They relished sweeping away old political institutions and existing social structures. Above all, they made a virtue of ruthlessness.

The empire states of the mid-20th century were to a considerable extent the architects of their own demise. In particular, the Germans and Japanese imposed their authority on other peoples with such unbridled ferocity that they undermined local collaboration thus laying the foundations for indigenous resistance. At the same time, their territorial ambitions were so boundless that they swiftly conjured into being an unassailable coalition of imperial rivals in the form of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Empires do not survive for long if they cannot establish and sustain local consent and if they allow more powerful coalitions of rival empires to unite against them. The crucial question is whether or not today's global powers behave differently from their imperial forebears.

Publicly, the leaders of the American and Chinese republics deny entertaining imperial designs. Both states are the product of revolutions and have entrenched anti-imperialist traditions. Yet the mask does slip on occasions. In 2004 a senior presidential advisor confided to a journalist: "We're an empire now and when we act, we create our own reality." Similar thoughts may cross the minds of China's leaders. In any case, it is perfectly possible for a republic to behave like an empire in practice, while remaining in denial about its loss of republican virtue.

A historical pattern of U.S. imperial intervention underpins the widespread assumption that the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq will not long outlast President Bush's term in office. Empire —

especially unstated empire — is ephemeral in a way that sets our own age quite apart. In the American case, however, the real snag is not the alienation of conquered peoples or threats posed by rival empires (the prime solvents of other 20th-century empires) but domestic constraints. These take three distinct forms.

The first can be classified as a troop deficit. The United States prefers to maintain a relatively small proportion of its population in the armed forces, at 0.5 percent. Moreover, only a small and highly trained part of this military is available for combat duties overseas. Members of this elite are not to be readily sacrificed. Nor are they easy to replace.

The second constraint on America's tacit empire is the burgeoning budget deficit. The costs of the war in Iraq have substantially exceeded the administration's forecast: \$290 billion since the invasion in 2003.

Finally, there is the attention deficit. Past empires were not sorely taxed to sustain public support for protracted conflicts. The American public, by contrast, tires quickly. It has taken less than 18 months for a majority of American voters to start viewing the invasion of Iraq as a mistake.

An empire will thrive and endure so long as the benefits of exerting power over foreign peoples outstrip the costs of doing so in the eyes of the imperialists; and so long as the benefits of knuckling under a foreign yoke exceed the costs of resistance in the eyes of the subjects. Such calculations implicitly take stock of the potential costs of relinquishing power to a rival empire.

For the time being, the costs of empire building look too high to most Americans while the benefits seem at best nebulous. Moreover, a rival equipped or willing to do the job is clearly wanting. With its republican institutions battered but still intact, the United States hardly passes muster as a latter-day Rome.

All that may change, however. In a world where natural resources are destined to become scarcer, the old mainsprings of imperial rivalry resist. Empire today is both unstated and unsung. History suggests, though, that the calculus of power could well swing back in its favor tomorrow.

TEXTUAL EXERCISES

(Total: 10 marks, 2 per correct answer)

- a) Fill in each of the **two** gaps in paragraph four of the text above with an appropriate word or phrase:

“For what _____ are the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council if not a cozy _____ of empires past?”

- b) Choose the most appropriate substitute in context for the words underlined in paragraph twelve:

I. taxed: “Past empires were not sorely taxed to sustain public support for protracted conflicts.”

- 1) drained
- 2) compelled
- 3) levied
- 4) hurt
- 5) pressed

II. protracted: “Past empires were not sorely taxed to sustain public support for protracted conflicts.”

- 1) dreadful
- 2) damaging
- 3) drawn out
- 4) costly
- 5) withering

- c) Re-write the following sentence from the antepenultimate paragraph of the text starting as indicated below:

“An empire will thrive and endure so long as the benefits of exerting power over foreign peoples outstrip the costs of doing so in the eyes of the imperialists.”

Only when the benefits _____

3 – COMPOSITION

(Total: 45 marks)

Write a composition on the following quotation from Albert Einstein:

“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

(Length: 350-450 words)

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
INSTITUTO RIO BRANCO

CONCURSO DE ADMISSÃO À CARREIRA DE DIPLOMATA

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

1 – TRANSLATION

(Total: 30 marks)

A)

(15 marks)

Translate the following text adapted from Don Cupitt's *The Sea of Faith* (London: BBC, 1984) into Portuguese:

Prometheus Unbound

The mind's power to innovate and fashion pure fictions was traditionally seen as a source of sin. Saints sallied forth into the desert to do battle against the evil thoughts that rose unbidden in their imaginations. As we now view it, they were actually tussling with their own creativity, not Satan.

Since ancient times, the common theme in mythology is that there are appointed limits to human power and knowledge. Overstepping the bounds the gods had set was tantamount to courting disaster.

So powerfully alluring has been the theme of man's technological pride being brought low that new myths have continued to be hatched well into the modern age. As late as the 1960s techno-sceptics posited that the space programme might bring down divine wrath upon mankind. This ethic of tradition was patently designed to discourage unbridled innovation and social change.

B)

(15 marks)

Translate the following text adapted from an article by Mino Carta in *CartaCapital* (5th November 2005) into English:

O Velho Mundo fica muito longe

Karl Marx e Alexis de Tocqueville concordavam em um ponto: a extrema pobreza não gera revolta mas apatia.

Ralf Dahrendorf retoma o assunto em artigo recente. "A faixa da população de longe mais crítica – diz ele – é aquela que começou a progredir para novas e melhores condições, mas, lá pelas tantas, encontrou o caminho bloqueado. São estes os grupos que se mobilizam em contestações violentas e acabam por determinar grandes mudanças".

Dahrendorf pressentia, é claro, os desdobramentos da revolta da periferia parisiense, inspiradora de outras turbulências em vários cantos da Europa Ocidental.

Pensei no Brasil, vice-campeão mundial em má distribuição de renda, onde 70% das famílias vivem, no máximo, com dois salários mínimos e 30% dos habitantes vegetam abaixo da linha de pobreza. Sem contar a herança da escravidão que deixou nos lombos nativos a marca funda do chicote.

2 - SUMMARY & TEXTUAL EXERCISES

(Total: 25 marks)

- A. Read the following text, adapted from “Radical Islam, Liberal Islam” by M. A. Muqtedar Khan (*CURRENT HISTORY*, Vol. 102, n. 668, December 2003), and complete the exercises at the end. (10 marks)
- B. Summarise the text, **in your own words**, in up to 200 words. (15 marks)

American foreign policy currently faces a critical menace from the Muslim World in the guise of burgeoning, embedded anti-Americanism in the Muslim World. That has already bred a catastrophic attack on America, two wars, and a significant compromise of American democracy. It is therefore of utmost importance that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world be addressed, extenuated and even reversed.

The root of Muslim anti-Americanism is twofold: the manifestly unjust consequences of American foreign policies; and the casting of America as the “designated other” in Islamist discourse. Islamist discourse has concocted the idea of an Islamic civilization diametrically opposed to a caricaturized West. Islamists define the West as imperial, morally decadent, ungodly (secular). Western power and values are vilified as the source of all Muslim grievances. They proceed to envisage a reinvigorated Islamic civilization depicted as just, moral and god-centered. Thus, the routing of the West and the rebuffing of Western values are *sine qua non* conditions for the revival of Islam.

Independence from the West has ever been the overriding goal of political Islam. Failure to achieve that goal, compounded by real and perceived injustices committed by America and its allies, has grafted vitriolic hatred of America in the hearts of radical Islamists. They and their hate mongering are perverting the moral fabric of the Muslim World and subverting Islam’s message of justice, mercy, submission, compassion and enlightenment.

It is my contention that the best anti-dote to radical Islam is liberal Islam, which is sympathetic to liberal values. Islam is essentially a set of revealed values designed to help prod humanity along the path to enlightenment and virtue. Many such values were nurtured in the heyday of liberal Islam in Islamic Spain, under Emperor Akber in Mughal India and under the Abbasid caliphate in the heartlands of Islam. The atmosphere of

religious tolerance under their rule was comparable to the best of times in America. Educational and scientific fervor was at its peak and pluralism was widely practiced. Indeed, Islam was a byword for learning and culture.

“Moderate” is commonly taken to mean lukewarm. This is misleading and demeaning. Moderate Muslims can be best understood as having achieved a negotiated peace with modernity. They treat it as the existential condition of our time while submitting to the message of Islam. By grasping the distinction between historical Islam and Islamic principles, they are able to bridge the gap between text and context through rational interpretation.

Moderate Muslims, who favor peace without being pacifists, are critical of American foreign policy for the Muslim World. They too denounce the prejudiced view of Islam in the West. Muslim moderates refuse, though, to blame the West or modernity for all the afflictions besetting the Muslim World.

Islamists, both moderate and radical, use an imaginary, caricatured version of the West as a foil for Islamic identity. Islam is the reverse of the West: it is moral, it is just, it is righteous and it is not secular. This image of the West in the minds of many Islamists is partly the consequence of a radical reading of Syed Qutb’s diatribes against secularism and modernity in Nasserite Egypt.

Islamists, however, are not alone in their misrepresentation of Syed Qutb. In a recent article in the *New York Times* Paul Berman argued that it was Qutb’s philosophy and understanding of Islam that provided the ideological underpinning for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The revulsion of liberalism and the desire to preserve Islam from the cultural impact of modern secularism combined with a desire to become martyrs in the cause of Islam, Berman argues, are the cornerstones of Qutb’s ideology. He also insists that while Qutb is indeed critical of the US, its perfidious foreign policy and its support for Israel, he does not really focus on it. Qutb, according to Berman, and in my opinion correctly, is more concerned with ideas, values and norms that shape society than with geopolitical conflicts.

Berman also holds that it is not American foreign policy but the challenge of liberalism, particularly its morality that vexes Qutb. By implication, the US _____ change its foreign policy but those motivated by aversion for liberalism will continue to seek the downfall of the West as long as its culture continues to influence the world, the Muslim World in particular. Berman’s reading not _____ absolves US foreign

policy from being a major cause of incitement _____ rebellion and resistance among Islamic militants, but also suggests that this is indeed a clash of civilizations – Islam versus liberalism.

While advancing the notion that there can be alternative readings of Muslim ideologues, I am also arguing that discourse is what we make of it. Ideas have an impact on reality, but reality in turn affects the formation of ideas and how ideas are apprehended. Some Muslims read Qutb and are motivated to use violence against their regimes and the West, whom they perceive as tyrannical. Others read him as an advocate of freedom, social justice and responsible governance.

The different readings of Syed Qutb underscore the diversity within Islam and among Muslims. Profiles of Islam and Muslims cannot be painted with broad brushes. Quick, single-variable explanations as to why Muslims are angry at the US will not suffice. Muslim realities, like Muslim thinking, are complex, diverse and challenging. As policy makers in Washington rethink the Muslim World, they would do well to remember that ethnocentric interpretations and sweeping judgments will only heighten misunderstanding and lead to bad policy. Bad things ensue from bad policy.

A liberal reading of Qutb reveals him as a philosopher of freedom and justice, not a philosopher of terror. Similarly, a sympathetic view of the Muslim World will reveal a thirst for freedom and justice, not a penchant for violence or hate. American policy makers do recognize the significance and potential of liberal Islam and the strategic value of supporting moderate Muslims. However, they have so far shown interest only in using moderates to lend legitimacy to certain US policies in the Muslim World. They have not taken on board moderate Muslim input in shaping post-September 11 policies nor have they sought their assistance in moderating the government's rhetoric and messages to the Muslim World. But then the current US administration has proven to be secretive, closed, and insular, excluding even moderate conservatives from policy making. It would be pie in the sky to expect this administration to include diverse opinion. The potential of moderate Muslims thus remains untapped.

TEXTUAL EXERCISES

(Total: 10 marks, 2 per correct answer)

- a) Fill in the **three** gaps in the text above with an appropriate word or phrase.

“Berman also holds that it is not American foreign policy but the challenge of liberalism, particularly its morality that vexes Qutb. By implication, the US _____ change its foreign policy but those motivated by aversion for liberalism will continue to seek the downfall of the West as long as its culture continues to influence the world, the Muslim World in particular. Berman’s reading not _____ absolves US foreign policy from being a major cause of incitement _____ rebellion and resistance among Islamic militants, but also suggests that this is indeed a clash of civilizations – Islam versus liberalism.”

- b) Choose the **most appropriate** substitute in context for the words underlined:

I. grafted: “Failure to achieve that goal, compounded by real and perceived injustices committed by America and its allies, has grafted vitriolic hatred of America in the hearts of radical Islamists.”

- 1) etched
- 2) transplanted
- 3) inserted
- 4) corrupted
- 5) instilled

II. lukewarm: “*Moderate* is commonly taken to mean lukewarm.”

- 1) aloof
- 2) half-hearted
- 3) frail
- 4) neutral
- 5) gutless

3 – COMPOSITION

(45 marks)

Awareness that change is a constant feature of human life is as old as civilisation. However, more recently, technological development has greatly enhanced both the prospects for rapid change and the range of its social, political, and cultural impact.

Bearing this in mind, **comment on Berman’s contention** (in Muqtedar Khan’s text “Radical Islam, Liberal Islam” in section 2 above) **that “those motivated by aversion for liberalism will continue to seek the downfall of the West as long as its culture continues to influence the world, the Muslim World in particular”**.

(Set length 350-450 words)

**Ministério das Relações Exteriores
Instituto Rio Branco**

Concurso de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata

em 3 de julho de 2005

Prova de Inglês

EXAMINADORES:

Manuel A. Carlos Montenegro Lopes da Cruz
Edite do Céu Faial Jacques
Mark David Ridd

1 – TRANSLATION

(Total: 30 marks)

Translate the following text adapted from an article by Pedro Gómez-Valadés in *La Insignia* (13th June, 2005) into English:

Europa, sem pressa, mas sem pausa

Nunca ninguém disse que o processo de construção europeia fosse fácil. Superar séculos de confrontos habitualmente resolvidos por via militar não é exatamente o melhor alicerce para a construção. Ou talvez sim. A unidade política da Europa é um caminho sem retorno. Desenham-se muito claro os espaços geopolíticos que serão os pivôs da política mundial no século atual: os Estados Unidos; a China, onde todos os algarismos são astronômicos, com o seu disciplinado mercado de trabalho e pujante aparelho político-militar a serviço de uma expansão econômica de que só começamos a vislumbrar o começo; a Índia, país que entrou devagar pela porta dos fundos, já em todas as apostas das potências do século; e a União Europeia.

É evidente que os golpes contundentes que a Constituição europeia acaba de sofrer por parte da cidadania francesa e holandesa, obrigam a fazer uso daquela máxima que dizia: “Estamos em guerra, temos que refletir”. Claro que não se trata de um conflito bélico, mas o tremor que há duas semanas sacode os campos da Europa bem merece uma reflexão.

O medo da eventual entrada da Turquia mobilizou, lamentavelmente, mais do que qualquer outro argumento tirado do próprio texto constitucional em debate. A xenofobia foi um dos pilares da contestação ao Tratado Constitucional europeu.

Não é fácil, lógico e evidente, assumir que um dos efeitos irreversíveis e talvez um dos mais (permitam-me a licença poética) formosos da globalização é a mestiçagem de culturas, nações e raças. A Europa, berço da civilização, não deve ser mais do que exemplo de integração. Não será fácil. Contudo, dar por morta a Constituição Europeia não deixa de ser só uma manchete de jornal. Mais nada. A sensatez obriga a abrir um tempo de reflexão de que, tenho certeza, sairão soluções. Para já, o democrático é continuar com o processo de ratificação dos diferentes estados. Interrompê-lo agora seria um precedente gravíssimo, um fato quase orwelliano. "Todos os Estados da Europa são iguais, mas uns são mais iguais do que outros".

2 - SUMMARY & TEXTUAL EXERCISES

(Total: 25 marks)

- A. Read the following text, adapted from a report by Richard Gott, in *The Guardian* (Saturday, 11th June, 2005) and complete the exercises at the end of it. (10 marks)
- B. Summarise the text, **in your own words**, in up to 200 words. (15 marks)

A seismic upheaval among Latin America's Indians *The crisis in Bolivia has put the continent's balance of power in question*

When the Spanish conquistadors arrived on the immense plains of the westerly part of Bolivia, they paused at a settlement not far from the rim of a great canyon. At 12,000ft they found it too cold, and they made their permanent base in the relative shelter of the slopes below and founded the city of La Paz.

The village of El Alto on the high plateau, which 30 years ago was home only to the capital's international airport, has now become a huge metropolis of nearly a million Indians, driven there over the past 20 years by the irresistible force of neo-liberal economics. The prevailing economic system, devised by US economists in the 1980s, succeeded in destroying the country's agricultural system and its embryonic industries, and closing down the state-owned tin mines – once the source of the wealth of Spain. This predictable disaster brought hundreds of thousands of workless but highly politicised families to live at the gates of the capital city, from where they have been able to hold it to _____ at will. Others migrated to the lower regions of the country, to the Chapare, to grow the profitable crop of coca leaf, the base of cocaine.

The demands of the Indians have been uncompromisingly radical. They make no mention of work or food, education or health. They have only two specific requests: a new constitution that would recognise the part that they should play in the government of the country (in which they form more than 60% of the population of 8 million), and the return to the hands of the state of the country's reserves of oil and gas.

Oil was nationalised in Bolivia first in 1937, a year before the Mexican wells were expropriated, and again in 1970. The shell of the state company, YPF, still exists, and most Bolivians remain implacably _____ to foreign ownership, but private oil companies have kept coming back. When immense reserves of natural gas were discovered in the 1990s, some 50 trillion cubic feet at the last estimate, Bolivia became ever more attractive to external predators, its reserves second _____ to those of Venezuela.

The government and the companies (British Gas and Spain's Repsol among them) were keen to get the gas out of the ground and down to the coast, to be shipped off to California. Others, notably the spokesmen for the Indian majority, thought that the gas might be better used to fuel Bolivia's own industrial development. The government's attempts to secure the export of the gas through Chile, Bolivia's traditional enemy, ended in October 2003 when violent protests in El Alto led to the overthrow of President Sánchez de Losada, Bolivia's last elected president. This week's events have been an almost exact replay, with the resignation of the stop-gap president, Carlos Mesa, after prolonged Indian demonstrations and roadblocks had made the country ungovernable by his regime. Something new was required.

The chief emerging protagonist in the next stage of Bolivia's drama is Evo Morales, an Aymara Indian from the high plateau who became the organiser of the coca growers in the Chapare, in the headwaters of the Amazon. From this base of desperate landless peasants and politicised former tin miners, he has become a national figure, allying the socialist rhetoric of the traditional Bolivian left with the fresh language of the indigenous population, now mobilised and angry.

Morales leads the Movement Towards Socialism, and is an outspoken supporter of Castro's Cuba. He is also a favourite son of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, whose wider ambition has been to replicate the revolution of Simón Bolívar, whose name is immortalised in that of Bolivia. The Americans have accused Chávez of providing Morales with assistance at the presidential election in 2002 (in which he came second), and this would hardly be unusual since all parties in Bolivia depend on external patrons, whether from Europe or the US. Morales has certainly taken a leaf from Chávez's book in demanding the holding of a constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution. This was Chávez's triumph in 1999, modernising and radicalising the country with a single blow before the forces of opposition could mobilise to prevent him.

The crisis came to a head as the Congress met to accept President Mesa's resignation in the old colonial capital of Sucre (away from the protesters in La Paz). According to the Constitution, the presidency would then fall to Hormando Vaca Díaz, the president of the Senate and a wealthy white landowner from the lowland eastern region, centred on the city of Santa Cruz. The area around Santa Cruz is the principal wealth-producer of the country, with the soya fields of agribusiness on the surface, and oil and gas underground. This is the land of more recent white settlers who have been opposed to the political emergence of the Indian majority in the western high lands, and to the Indian resistance that has emerged to challenge them in the lowlands. Elite white groups have been asking for autonomy – some even argue for independence – and have unilaterally called for a referendum on this issue in August.

Vaca Díaz had the support of the largest parties in Congress but was unacceptable to the Indians and, under pressure from the leaders of the armed forces and the Catholic Church, he declined the task. So too did Mario Cossio, the second constitutional choice. It fell to the third in line, Eduardo Rodríguez, president of the Supreme Court and a man without political affiliation, to take up the challenge. Fresh elections will be held before the end of the year, and Morales's demand for a constituent assembly is on the agenda.

If Morales eventually emerges as Bolivia's elected president, the relation of forces in the countries of the Andes will be changed, since comparable indigenous movements in neighbouring countries are also demanding their proper share of power.

A. TEXTUAL EXERCISES

(2 marks per correct answer)

a) Fill in the **three** gaps in the text above with an appropriate word or phrase.

I. “This predictable disaster brought hundreds of thousands of workless but highly politicised families to live at the gates of the capital city, from where they have been able to hold it to _____ at will.”

II. “The shell of the state company, YPFB, still exists, and most Bolivians remain implacably _____ to foreign ownership, but private oil companies have kept coming back.”

III. “When immense reserves of natural gas were discovered in the 1990s, some 50 trillion cubic feet at the last estimate, Bolivia became ever more attractive to external predators, its reserves second _____ to those of Venezuela.”

b) Choose the **most appropriate** substitute for the words or phrases underlined:

I. Stop-gap: “... the resignation of the stop-gap president ...”

- (1) replacement
- (2) dithering
- (3) transient
- (4) interim
- (5) filler

II. Shell: “The shell of the state company, YPFB, still exists...”

- (1) core
- (2) husk
- (3) wealth
- (4) trappings
- (5) wherewithal

B. SUMMARY

(15 marks)

Summarise the text, **in your own words**, in up to 200 words.

3 – COMPOSITION

(Total 45 marks)

Read the following editorial from the *Washington Post*, 20th March, 2005, and in the light of it and of the text by Richard Gott in section 2, **comment on the geopolitical, social, and economic issues raised as they affect South American integration.**

A THREAT TO LATIN DEMOCRACY

Another Latin American democracy is on the verge of crumbling under pressure from leftist populism. The trouble comes this time in Bolivia, where a democratic president and Congress face a paralyzing mix of strikes and roadblocks by a radical movement opposed to foreign investment and free-market capitalism. The insurgents, who claim to represent the country's indigenous population, drove one democratically elected president from office 18 months ago; now they are working on his successor, Carlos Mesa, who has searched valiantly but unsuccessfully for compromise. The populists ride a leftist wave of momentum in Latin America and have the rhetorical, and possibly material, support of the region's self-styled "Bolivarian" revolutionary, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The democrats could use some outside help, from their neighbors and the United States.

Accounts of political crises in Andean countries such as Bolivia sometimes portray a poor and disenfranchised indigenous majority pitted against an ethnically European and mestizo elite. The facts tell a different story in Bolivia. Mr. Mesa, polls show, has the support of two-thirds of his compatriots, while the party leading the protests, the Movement Toward Socialism, has never received more than 21 percent of the vote in an election. Nor is it the case that Bolivia's experiment with free-market policies in the 1990s failed to help the poor. Per capita incomes rose by 20 percent in the second half of the decade. Thanks to private foreign investment, significantly more Bolivians gained access to water, sewage systems and electricity.

The populist minority, led by former coca farmer Evo Morales, is bent on using force to reverse that progress. Already it has effectively blocked natural gas exports to the United States. Its current strikes are aimed at stopping further foreign investment in that industry through confiscatory taxes and reversing the privatization of other industries. Mr. Mesa, swearing off the use of force to break up the roadblocks, has countered with democratic political

tactics: first a national referendum on a compromise gas policy, then an accord with Congress on political and economic reforms. Last week, in desperation, he proposed that his own term as president be cut short and new elections be held in August; Congress rejected the proposal, and Mr. Mesa later announced he would stay on. But the opposition still threatens to renew a blockade that is devastating one of the hemisphere's poorest economies and prompting talk of secession in Bolivia's relatively prosperous and pro-capitalist eastern provinces.

All of this is good news for Mr. Chavez, who along with Cuba's Fidel Castro dreams of a new bloc of Latin "socialist" (i.e., undemocratic) regimes that will join with like-minded states such as Iran, Libya and China to oppose the United States. Bolivia's neighbors, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile, ought to be alarmed by this trend; but though their own leftist governments have expressed support for Mr. Mesa they have refrained from more concerted action -- such as demanding that Mr. Chavez cease his meddling. The State Department issued a statement last week expressing "support for the people of Bolivia and a peaceful democratic process." If there is a deeper U.S. policy to head off the breakdown of democracy in Latin America, there isn't much sign of it.

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas correspondentes do caderno de rascunho. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do **CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. Respeite os limites mínimos e máximos de palavras estabelecidos.

ATENÇÃO! Nas **folhas do caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

EXAMINADORES:

Manuel A. Carlos Montenegro Lopes da Cruz

Edite do Céu Faial Jacques

Mark David Ridd

PART 1 – Translation A

Translate the following passage into English:

As contradições do sistema colonial têm de comum unicamente isto: refletem a desagregação do sistema e brotam dele. Veremos brancos lutar com pretos e mulatos contra o preconceito de cor; mulatos e pretos, com os brancos, a favor dele; portugueses contra a metrópole, e brasileiros a favor.

A aparência ilógica e incongruente dos fatos não só torna difícil sua interpretação como constitui a razão da dubiedade e incerteza que apresentam todas as situações semelhantes. Dubiedade e incerteza que estão nos próprios fatos, e que nenhum artifício de explicação pode desfazer. Os fatos claros, em seu conjunto e definidos, só vêm em seguida, quando tais situações amadurecem. Inútil procurá-los antes, torcendo os acontecimentos ao gosto particular do observador. É o movimento eterno da História, do Homem e de todas as coisas que não pára e não cessa, e que nós, com os pobres instrumentos de compreensão e de expressão que possuímos, não apanhamos e sobretudo não podemos reproduzir senão numa parcela ínfima, cortes desajeitados numa realidade que não se define estática, e sim dinamicamente.

Caió Prado Junior. *Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo*. São Paulo: Brasiliense/Publifolha, 2000 (com adaptações).

(15 marks)

PART 1 – Translation B

Translate the following passage from João Guimarães Rosa's "O Espelho" into English:

O senhor, que estuda, suponho nem tenha idéia do que seja na verdade — um espelho? Demais das noções de física, com que se familiarizou, as leis da ótica. Reporto-me ao transcendente. Tudo, aliás, é a ponta de um mistério. Inclusive, os fatos. Ou a ausência deles. Duvida? Quando nada acontece, há um milagre que não estamos vendo.

Fixemo-nos no concreto. O espelho, são muitos, captando-lhe as feições; todos refletem-lhe o rosto, e o senhor crê-se com aspecto próprio e praticamente imudado, do qual lhe dão imagem fiel. Mas — que espelho? Há-os "bons" e "maus", os que favorecem e os que detraem; e os que são apenas honestos, pois não. E onde situar o nível dessa honestidade? Como é que o senhor, eu, os restantes próximos, somos, no visível? O senhor dirá: as fotografias o comprovam. Respondo: que, além de prevalecerem para as lentes das máquinas objeções análogas, seus resultados apóiam antes que desmentem a minha tese, tanto revelam superporem-se aos dados iconográficos os índices do mistério. Ainda que tirados de imediato um após outro, os retratos sempre serão entre si muito diferentes. Se nunca atentou nisso, é porque vivemos, de modo incorrigível, distraídos das coisas mais importantes.

Primeiras Estórias, 12.ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1981 (com adaptações).

(15 marks)

PART 2 – SUMMARY

Read the following text and **in your own words** summarise it in up to 200 words.

Summit meetings can have their drawbacks. The assumption that personal acquaintances between the leaders of states will forestall future conflicts has often been gainsaid by history. Summits that peacefully negotiated the settlement of conflicts seldom produced outcomes with long-term consequences. During the Cold War debate as to their value abounded. Some of the arguments fielded then still provide ammunition for critics today. How can the head of a democratic country deal successfully with the leader of a totalitarian system or dictatorship? With the main actors rooted in different cultures it is suggested that such encounters can but lead to shallow understandings. In the long term, they could actually deepen the divide. Heads of state are not experts in the highly complex matters that clutter summit agendas. They lack the diplomatic skills of professional diplomats and are often ill-prepared for these debates. Under pressure of time and the weight of expectations from the public at home, politicians are often tempted to compromise with false solutions. Since summit agreements are mostly not legally binding, statesmen do not even feel politically obliged to deliver. Critics also complain that calling summit meetings compels politicians and bureaucrats to set spurious priorities with respect to time, political resources, and energy. Nevertheless, most of these arguments can be countered. They have nothing to do with summits as such, but rather with the way these meetings are prepared and conducted as instruments of modern diplomacy.

The advantages of multilateral summitry cannot be easily measured in short-term tangible results. In the long haul, however, they certainly can render more than just an improved atmosphere for international political negotiation, although that is a value in itself if handled properly and used with the right political nous.

Summit meetings have acquired new roles and special functions. From this standpoint, I want to argue that summits are an important element of international political negotiation and yield the following benefits.

Personal contact between heads of state and government adds new factors to the equation of power. Military and economic might certainly count still, but the personality of a leader, the way he performs in debate, and the thrust of his intellect will be factored into the discussions at a summit meeting. This affords a chance to redress imbalances and to obtain results universally accepted as legitimate. After all, summitry is a democratic invention and not much to the liking of dictators.

Summit meetings have eminently practical effects. To prepare for a summit and avert failure, bureaucrats are constrained to set goals and time-frames for solutions that might otherwise have been stalled or shelved.

Summits have a legitimizing function, nationally as well as internationally. Commitments undertaken by a political leader during a summit meeting can open up new avenues in domestic political debate or provide fresh opportunities to break deadlocks. On the other hand, an agreement or even a mere understanding on the interpretation of facts reached by several heads of state also has norm-setting qualities for the international community. Such guidelines not only bind the participating nations together in implementing their policies, but also set standards for others.

To retain its useful role, however, the summit must evolve and be constantly subject to review. One expedient reform would address the problem of how to stem or reverse the current trend toward ever larger, more elaborate summits. These meetings can and should be reduced in size, the numbers of aides and fellow participants slashed and more strenuous efforts made to muffle the media spectacle surrounding the event itself.

It has become fashionable to demand greater participation by NGOs in the summit process. This is tantamount to insinuating that heads of state are out of tune with the public and not liable to democratic domestic control. The rights and duties of such organizations should be carefully defined, though. Certainly, it might help if state and non-state actors work more closely together in the future than they have to date.

Finally, it sometimes makes sense to have the broadest political participation by all states. But opening up each summit can also exact a price, impairing States' capacity to act. Likewise, if outcomes merely reflect the least common denominator, they will prove hollow. Legitimacy is not just a question of numbers.

If these considerations are heeded, summits have a bright future. In today's world, "summitry belongs to the dramaturgy of globalism which in turn pertains to the future of world politics."

Adapted from Peter Weilemann's "The Summit Meeting: The Role and Agenda of Diplomacy at its Highest Level". In: *NIRA Review*. Spring 2000.

(20 marks)

PART 3 – COMPOSITION

Length: 350 to 450 words

Read the following text on Diplomacy and Democracy and, in the light of it and any of the ideas raised in the texts in Parts 1 & 2 above, assess the benefits and drawbacks of public diplomacy (in which media exposure enhances the emotional dimension) as compared with diplomacy as a rational, technical activity entrusted to specialists.

Alexis de Tocqueville wrote as follows in his classic 1835 book **Democracy in America**, defining a problem of democratic governance that is as old as the Greeks: "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience."

The problem Tocqueville examined then has become far more acute now. Public awareness has increased and the media are far more intrusive. But neither has kept pace with the growing complexity of foreign policy issues. No country can or should, for instance, join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) without the people's support. How few of them, though, know or can know enough to form an opinion on the issue?

The dilemma persists because it is inherent in a democracy — the volatility and power of public opinion and the weaknesses of democratic leadership. Not seldom, the preference of the majority is at odds with the requirements of sound policy, domestic or foreign. Not seldom an issue of foreign policy arouses the people from the slumber that is the norm, to shake them with paroxysms of moral outrage. Few are the leaders who have the moral fibre, the political skill and the intellectual muscle required to explain such realities to them. Having ignored the rumblings, most opt for mere survival when the crisis bursts into the open.

Hans J. Morgenthau traces the dilemma to its roots — the statesman, as distinct from the common politician, has to reckon with considerations which the populace cannot grasp. "The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind reasons in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. The statesman must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, paying with small losses for great advantages; he must be able to temporise, to compromise, to bide his time. The popular mind wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage. By a psychological paradox, the most vociferous and compromising representatives of what is least conducive to the successful conduct of foreign policy are generally politicians who in their own constituencies would not dream of acting the way they expect the framers of foreign policy to act... The daily routine of their political lives is devoid of those moral and intellectual qualities which they really admire, which to the public they pretend to possess, and which they wish they were able to practise... they make foreign policy over into a sort of fairy-land where virtue triumphs and vice is punished, where heroes fight for principle without thought of consequence, and where the knight in shining armour comes to the succour of the ravished nation, taking the villain's life even though he might in the process lose his own."

Leaders have four options. One is simply to sail with the wind of public opinion and treat public opinion polls as the supreme guide. The second is to educate public opinion in the realities of the times. A British diplomat, Lord Vansittart, sharply defined this age-old problem: "How to induce the unwilling to accept the unavoidable."

The third option is to mislead and corrupt public opinion — and cite the result in defence of the official stand. The leader whips up the people to a frenzy of chauvinism and defends his intransigence as obedience to the people's will.

The last option is to practise deception.

Adapted from A.G. Noorani's "Of diplomacy and democracy." *Frontline*, v. 18 - Issue 23, Nov. 10 - 23, 2001.

(50 marks)

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas correspondentes do caderno de rascunho. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do **CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. Utilize os limites mínimos e máximos de palavras estabelecidos. Qualquer texto com extensão aquém da mínima será apenado, e qualquer fragmento de texto que ultrapasse a extensão máxima será desconsiderado.

ATENÇÃO! Nas **folhas do caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

EXAMINADORES:

Manuel A. Carlos Montenegro Lopes da Cruz
Edite do Céu Faial Jacques
Mark David Ridd

PART 1 – TRANSLATION A

Translate the following passage into English:

Depois da Síria, agora o Irã é a bola da vez. Em comunicado endossado pelos EUA e outros países, a Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA) declarou que Teerã falhou ao deixar de cumprir as obrigações de salvaguarda nuclear e que o programa nuclear iraniano é “preocupante”. Washington acusa o governo iraniano de construir uma usina para o enriquecimento de urânio. Enfático, Bush afirmou que os EUA não vão tolerar armas nucleares em território iraniano. “A comunidade internacional deve se unir para sinalizar claramente ao Irã que não toleramos o desenvolvimento de armas nucleares no País. O Irã torna-se perigoso caso venha a fabricar um dispositivo nuclear”, disse. Washington pressiona Teerã para que aceite incondicionalmente as inspeções da ONU. O presidente iraniano, Mohammed Khatami, negou a fabricação de bombas atômicas. “Não acreditamos que armas atômicas tragam segurança à nação”, afirmou Khatami. Para o analista Mario Sznajder, da Universidade de Jerusalém, a razão da pressão é o petróleo na Península Arábica. “Se algum estado do Golfo Pérsico ameaçar usar armas nucleares, isso prejudica a extração de petróleo e destroça a economia mundial, porque 60% da produção no mundo vem da região”, disse à revista **IstoÉ**.

Adaptado de **IstoÉ**, 25 de junho de 2003.

(10 marks)

Part 1 – TRANSLATION B

In 1938, Graciliano Ramos served on a panel of judges in a literary contest that passed up Guimarães Rosa's **Sagarana** to select Luís Jardim's **Maria Perigosa**. The excerpt below is adapted from Ramos' "Conversa de Bastidores," which was included as a preface to the seventh edition of **Sagarana**.

Translate this excerpt into English:

Pois nesse júri cinco indivíduos, murchos com o golpe de 10 de novembro, indispostos ao elogio, enfasiados, decidiram ler mais de cinqüenta volumes. Podem imaginar como a tarefa se realiza. A gente folheia o troço, bocejando, fazendo caretas, admite enfim que a leitura é desnecessária; solta-o, pega um papel, rabisca um zero, às vezes qualquer reflexão enérgica. E passa adiante. Alguma coisa razoável é posta de lado e mais tarde se examina.

Aborrecendo-me assim, abri um cartapácio de quinhentas páginas grandes: uma dúzia de contos enormes, assinados por certo Viator. Em tais casos, rogamos a Deus que o original não preste e nos poupe o dever de ir ao fim. Não se deu isso: aquele era trabalho sério em demasia. Certamente de um médico mineiro e lembrava a origem: montanhoso, subia muito, descia — e os pontos elevados eram magníficos, os vales me desapontavam.

No dia do julgamento, ficamos horas hesitando entre esse volume desigual e outro: **Maria Perigosa**, que não se elevava nem caía muito. Optei pelo segundo.

Viator desapareceu sem deixar vestígio. Desgostei-me: eu desejava sinceramente vê-lo crescer, talvez convencer-me de meu engano ao preteri-lo.

Em fim de 1944, Idelfonso Falcão apresentou-me J. Guimarães Rosa, secretário de embaixada, recém-chegado da Europa.

- O senhor figurou num júri que julgou um livro meu em 1938.
- Como era o seu pseudônimo?
- Viator.
- Sabe que votei contra o seu livro?
- Sei, respondeu-me sem nenhum ressentimento.

(20 marks)

PART 2 – SUMMARY

Read the following text and summarise it in up to 200 words:

At some point in the technological era we have taken a wrong fork on the road. Diverted from the struggle for survival against harsh, forbidding Nature, scientific research and development of technology have become an urge not only to dominate and control Nature, but also to wage war on such a scale that man and nature may both be obliterated. Science and technology have become a force for destruction rather than creation. Furthermore, military technology has become so sophisticated that one person, safe from harm himself, now has the capability to annihilate hundreds of thousands or (in the case of nuclear warriors in secret underground missile silos) millions, utterly shielded from the result of his actions. The abstract nature of this kind of war breeds alienation allowing individuals unperturbed by moral qualms or misgivings to kill with impunity.

Moreover, in the West technology for portraying war to the general public has been developed deliberately to obviate moral outrage. An example of such avoidance is the forced cancellation of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki exhibition at the Smithsonian Institute in 1995 because it was deemed that the American people were not ready to face this. Another is the television depiction of the Iraq war, which was essentially a computerised simulation from which the armed forces and the thousands of civilian casualties were curiously absent.

Another deviant path is that travelled by the ancient idea of perfecting the self, originally a philosophical ideal concerning the soul and spiritual perfection. It has become an external technological manifestation, an exercise in perfecting the body through scientific and technological manipulation, from face lifts to transplants and endless prolongation of life through technological fixes or cloning.

Albert Schweitzer tells us that "Wherever consciousness is lost that every man is an object of concern to us simply because he is a man, civilisation and morals are shaken, and the advance to fully developed inhumanity is only a question of time."

As long as a dispassionate, unreflecting science reigns supreme, and the scientific model of nature is mathematical, devoid of the human factor, it is "only a question of time." As long as the only ethical requirement for science is to tell the truth, and as long as the only responsibility for the scientist, in Oppenheimer's words, is "to remain dedicated," it is "only a question of time."

As long as scientific enquiry and technological development remain unbridled, perhaps it is "only a question of time." The bounds to scientific enquiry are financial and imposed solely by the nature of humanity. "The human brain," claims Barrow, "was not evolved with science in mind." The language of science, mathematics, unlike communicative language, which is innate, is learned language — thus foreign to human minds.

British culture critic Raymond Williams reminds us that technology is not an inevitable series of transformations careering along the ringing grooves of change. Rather, it is a set of humanly decided and humanly alterable options for the application of skills. Lewis Mumford makes the point that the most important thing to come out of the mine is not coal or ore. Rather, the most important thing to come out of the mine is the miner.

Since the Enlightenment, according to Schweitzer, philosophy has "philosophised about everything except civilisation. She went on working unswervingly to establish a theoretical view of the universe, as though by means of it everything could be restored. She failed to cogitate that this theory, even were it to be completed, would be fashioned exclusively out of history and science, and would accordingly be unoptimistic and unethical. It would ever remain an 'impotent theory of the universe,' too puny to muster the energies needed to establish and maintain the ideals of civilisation."

If Heidegger is correct and we are "beings tending towards death," then Barrow's idea of progress, that is bereft of ideals "about progress of the whole," is our rationale for existence in the technological era. I, however, side with Socrates who on his deathbed wagered that we are beings tending towards Good and asserted that "absence of the knowledge of Good is not ignorance but madness."

Adapted from "Only A Question of Time: Science, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction," a lecture delivered by Jennifer Allen Simons at the Center for Theoretical Study, Charles University & Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic, 10th Anniversary Conference (The Diverse Landscape of Knowing: Can We Cope With It) August 28th - 30th, 2000.

(20 marks)

PART 3 – COMPOSITION

Length: 300 to 400 words

Read the following text on Leonardo da Vinci and, in the light of it and any of the ideas broached in the texts in Sections 1 & 2 above, **discuss the uses of art and technology and their relation to ethics in the current diplomatic scenario.**

Ever the perfectionist, Leonardo turned to science in the quest to improve his artwork. His study of nature and anatomy emerged in his stunningly realistic paintings, and his dissections of the human body paved the way for remarkably accurate figures. He was the first artist to study the physical proportions of men, women and children and to use these studies to determine the "ideal" human figure. Unlike many of his contemporaries — Michelangelo for example — he didn't get carried away and paint ludicrously muscular bodies, which he referred to as "bags of nuts."

All in all, Leonardo believed that the artist must know not just the rules of perspective, but all the laws of nature. The eye, he believed, was the perfect instrument for learning these laws, and the artist the perfect person to illustrate them.

Leonardo the scientist bridged the gap between the shockingly unscientific medieval methods and our own trusty modern approach. His experiments in anatomy and the study of fluids, for example, absolutely blew away the accomplishments of his predecessors. Beginning with his first stay in Milan and gathering pace around 1505, Leonardo became more and more wrapped up in his scientific investigations. The sheer range of topics that came under his inquiry is staggering: anatomy, zoology, botany, geology, optics, aerodynamics and hydrodynamics, among others.

As his curiosity took him in ever wilder directions, Leonardo always used this method of scientific inquiry: close observation, repeated testing of the observation, precise illustration of the subject, object or phenomenon with brief explanatory notes. The result was volumes of remarkable notes on an amazing variety of topics, from the nature of the sun, moon and stars to the formation of fossils and, perhaps most notably, the mysteries of flight.

Artists have always found it difficult to make a living off their art. And even a master like Leonardo was forced to sell out in order to support himself. So he adapted his drawing skills to the more lucrative fields of architecture, military engineering, canal building and weapons design. Although a peacenik at heart, Leonardo landed a job working for the Duke of Milan by calling himself a military engineer and outlining some of his sinister ideas for weapons and fortifications. Like many art school types in search of a salary, he only briefly mentioned to the Duke that he could paint as well.

Lucky for Leonardo, he was actually really talented as an engineer. Good illustrators were a dime a dozen in Renaissance Italy, but Leonardo had the brains and the diligence to break new ground, usually leaving his contemporaries in the dust. Like many crackpot geniuses, Leonardo wanted to create "new machines" for a "new world."

Adapted from texts at <<http://www.mos.org/leonardo>>.

(50 marks)